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I. Introduction
Over the past few decades, much has changed in the adoption
community of birthparents, adoptive families, adoptive children,
and those who facilitate adoption. After a slow start, international
adoptions gained steam at the end of the 20th century and into the
21st century.'
Intercountry adoption has since become an
international political battleground.2
On the political front,
international adoption has become one of many weapons in the
t Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law.
I U.N. DEP'T. OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, CHILD ADOPTION: TRENDS AND POLICIES
18 (2009). See Richard Carlson, TransnationalAdoption of Children, 23 TULSA L.J.
317, 324-31 (1988) (describing the acceleration of intercountry adoptions during the
Korean War, and then after 1961, with non-war orphans).
2 See infra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
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arsenal of nation-state competition, as most recently witnessed in
Russia's December 2012, decision to halt adoptions of Russian
children by American parents.' While many Russians have chafed
at the fact that 60,000 Russian children were adopted by
Americans in the past 20 years,4 this issue became prominent
international news in 2010, when a Tennessee adoptive mother
placed her allegedly violent seven-year-old adopted Russian son
on an airplane to return to Moscow by himself.' Despite a
subsequent adoption suspension and later 2011 accord on
adoptions between Russia and the United States, news stories of
abused and neglected Russian children in American parents' care,
including the death of a Russian adoptee accidentally left by his
adoptive father to die in a hot car, moved the Russian parliament
to act. 6 However, other sources claim that this move is in
retaliation for America's decision to label the nation a human
rights violator.'
Russia is not the only country to close down or severely curtail
intercountry adoptions due to political pressure from advocates
opposed to airing their national failures to care for parentless
children.! Perhaps most famously, Romania, which opened to

3 David Herszenhorn & Erik Eckholm, Putin Signs Bill That Bars U.S.
Adoptions, Upending Families, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-of-russian-children.html?
pagewanted=all&_r-0.
4 U.S.: Russian Bill to Halt Adoptions 'Misguided', HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 26,
2012,
2:16 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121226/us-russiaadoptions/?utm hp ref=homepage&ir-homepage. For a longer discussion of the
Russian adoption situation, see Jaci L. Wilkening, IntercountryAdoption Act Ten Years
Later: The Need for Post-Adoption Requirements, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1043, 1044-45
(2011).
5 Clifford J. Levy, Russia Callsfor Halt on U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/world/europe/I0russia.html? r-0&page
wanted-print.
6 Id
7 Amid ProposedAdoption Ban, UNICEF Asks Russia to Focus on Best Interests
of Children, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD-43846&Cr-child+rights&CRI#.USIfKW9-ul
[hereinafter
Amid ProposedAdoption Ban].
8 See U.N. DEP'T. OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 18 (noting countries
that are attempting to limit intercountry adoptions); Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: Propriety,Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 18 1,
184 (1996) (discussing political pressure in "sending countries" against "giving their
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intercountry adoption after severe post-Communist media
criticism of its dismal orphanages, halted adoptions in the wake of
popular objections to sending Romanian children out of the
country;' and Guatemala restricted a steady flow of intercountry
adoptions after receiving international criticism over allegedly
shady intermediary practices coercive to birthparents." Several
other countries have closed their doors or significantly restricted
intercountry adoptions due to similar criticisms."
Adoption scholars have joined in the critique on intercountry
adoptions. Some critics have challenged whether, for example,
any children should be adopted across racial lines or national
borders. 2 Other scholars like David Smolin have advocated for
national and international efforts to keep children with their birth
families unless there is a dire reason to relinquish them,
particularly when the decision to relinquish a child is primarily
based on the birth family's extreme poverty." Many in the
international community, including UNICEF, the European Union,
and the African Child Policy Forum have at times expressed a
preference for children staying within their national borders of
origin, even if it means living out their childhood in foster care or
an institution.14 Yet, few of these advocates contest the fact that
the existing options for many parentless children are unhappy
ones-even despite the Russian parliament's vote to end
intercountry adoptions to the United States, many of Russia's
countries' children to the imperialist North Americans and other foreigners.").
9 Elizabeth Bartholet, InternationalAdoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights
Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 151, 161 (2007).

10 Id. at 156.
11 Id. at 158.
12 See Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the
Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 112-15 (1990-91) (describing professionals' views
that African American children should be placed with African American families);
Bartholet, supra note 9, at 177-79 (noting international rights advocates' opposition).
13 See David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption As Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U.
L. REV. 281, 310-11 (2004) (arguing the international laws allow aid to be provided only
to birth parents who relinquish their children).
14 AFR. CHILD POL. F., INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 37

(2012); Bartholet, supra note 9, at 155-58; see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 191
(noting that international documents relegate international adoption to .'last resort'
status" as compared with foster care or 'other suitable care"' within the child's nation of
origin).

526

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Vol. XXXIX

700,000 parentless children grow up in dismal Russian
orphanages, and most Russians have been traditionally indifferent
to their plight. 5
The Hague Convention on Adoptionl 6 and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child" have attempted to protect rights that
members of the adoption triad (which includes birthparents,
adoptive parents, and adoptable children)'" should be afforded.
These Conventions are a good first step, but their primary role has
been to regulate the process of adoption to ensure procedural
justice and reliable fairness in the protocols surrounding
adoption.20
Broader international conventions concerning
children's rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, go further in articulating substantive rights of children.2'
15 See Cheryl L. Allen, The U.S.-Russian Child Adoption Agreement: An End to
FailedAdoptions?, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1690, 1701-02 (describing the abandonment
of children with disabilities, or quick transfer to orphanages, and the practice of Russian
doctors encouraging mothers to do so because of the underfunded Russian orphanage
system); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, InternationalAdoption: The Child'sStory, 24 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 333, 346-51 (2007) (describing situation of most adoptable children and
their prospects with intercountry adoption).
16 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session,
Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, availableat http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt33en.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
17 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm.
18 1 will use this term broadly to signify those children that may be candidates for
adoption because their birth parents are unwilling or unable to care for them properly,
whether that conclusion is reached by the parents themselves, their current caretakers, or
the state. I acknowledge that this term encompasses children in many very different
situations along the continuum from custody by birth parents to legal adoption by other
parents, but use it on the theory that the concerns and values I will discuss apply as soon
as a child is vulnerable to entering the "adoption stream" and continue until he or she is
legally someone else's child (and sometimes, due to adoption disruptions, beyond that
time).
19 See Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 4-5 (observing that consent needs to
be given); United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 169
(expressing the need to counsel and get consent from all parties).
20 See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 16, arts. 4 (pertaining to process of
obtaining informed consent), 7 (relating to information sharing), and 10-11 (relating to
accreditation of agencies).
21 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17,
at 168 (imposing a duty to protect the child's right to development in Article 6,
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They presumably apply to adopted as well as birth-children, but
they do not fully articulate how adoption, particularly intercountry
adoption, can be a means to making these rights real.22 While the
pros and cons of international adoption have been discussed
exhaustively and some scholars have made efforts to clarify
human rights concerns, this Article will try to put more substantive
flesh on the bones of the adoption conventions currently in place
by linking these articulated rights to the concept of human
dignity. 23
The Article begins with the assumption that
international protections for parentless children cannot function
effectively unless the world's nations come to a comprehensive
understanding of the unique role that adoption plays in
guaranteeing children's rights, particularly the right to human
dignity, amid the significant social changes that have occurred in
our world, particularly over the last fifty years.2 4
The touchstone for fleshing out substantive human rights
expectations in international conventions has been the concept of
human dignity, a concept both hard to define and consistently
recognized as core to the international human rights framework.
A cluster of meanings that grow out of our recognition of human
dignity are foundational to a just and workable adoption regime
across national lines, and governments should acknowledge that
the circumstances that lead to adoption do not reflect ideal social
and economic conditions (the realism principle); 25 that we live in
an increasingly interdependent world in all aspects of our life (the
global interdependence principle); 26 and that family diversity is
increasing and increasingly visible in contemporary life, which is a
positive thing for adoption (the family diversity principle).
Governments should recognize, too, that adoption law must
protecting a child's right to identity in Article 8, and protecting the child's right not to be
separated from his parents, except under enumerated circumstances in Article 9).
22 See, e.g., id at 169 (failing to demonstrate how adoption maintains the rights of
the children in Article 21 on adoption).
23 See infra notes 36-343 and accompanying text.
24 See Marie A. Failinger, Co-CreatingAdoption Law: A Lutheran Perspective, 51
DIALOG 226, 270 (2012) (noting that intercultural families thrive better than
institutionalized children).
25 See infra Sec. 1II.A and accompanying text.
26 See infra Sec. 1II.B and accompanying text.
27 See infra Sec. III.B.4 and accompanying text.
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account for a key attribute of the human person, which is
particularly evident in children: human vulnerability, as described
by Professor Martha Fineman and the human vulnerabilities
movement (the vulnerability principle).2 8
The four core principles of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child-"non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the
child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for
the views of the child" 2 9-can be re-anchored to the concept of
human dignity to inform these concerns about the value and
limitations of intercountry adoptions. The rights to life, survival,
and development recognized in the Convention give rise to
principles that should inform intercountry protocols beyond the
right to basic sustenance implied in the rights to life and survival,
namely, the right to the opportunity for growth, and the right to the
opportunity to love and be loved.30 In keeping with the principle
of realism, these rights to the opportunity for growth and the
opportunity to love and be loved must necessarily be described as
opportunity rights." In the real world, no nation state currently
demonstrates its full commitment to ensuring the growth and
development of its child-citizens.3 2 In any world we will ever
know, no nation state will be capable of ensuring that every child
will be loved or able to give love.33 These rights, instead, suggest
that the state should create structures and conditions for adoptable
children, as for all children, that make it possible, even likely, that
28 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8-9 (2008-09) (noting that
vulnerability is a "universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition").
29 Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Convention: Does
Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 6 WHITrIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 377 (2006-07).

30 See infra Sec. IV and accompanying text.
31

See id.

32 See generally Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption
Reflect Human Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 179, 182-85 (2003) (describing the overwhelming struggles of children in every part
of the world, regardless of the region's wealth).
33 See Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New
International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 733, 740 (2010-11) (citing
Professor Bartholet's concern that despite the issues of finding proper parents, the issues
elsewhere are so bad that we must stick with adoption); Dillon, supra note 32, at 182-85.
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a child will grow and flourish into adulthood, and that she will be
loved. 4
II. The Human Rights Instruments, Human Dignity, and
Adoption
The U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, passed on
November 20, 1959, and the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of
the Child, both foundational documents for covenants and
conventions pertaining to child adoption, recognize the rights of
children "to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity."36
The dignitary principle is similarly referenced in two of the
three most widely adopted international agreements relevant to the
concerns of adopted children: the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights" (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, though it is not in the Hague Convention on
Adoption." Interestingly, the preamble to the ICCPR references
these human rights using the metaphor of the family, "recognition
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world,"" which it later describes in Article 23(1)
as the "natural and fundamental group unit of society." 40 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child repeats the Declaration's

34

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 167-

69.
35 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (adopted September 26, 1924)
available at U.N. DOCUMENTS: GATHERING A BODY OF GLOBAL AGREEMENTS,
http://www.un-documents.net/gdrcl924.htm (visited Oct. 27, 2013).
36 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386(XIV),
U.N. Doc. A/4354, at 20 (Nov. 20, 1959), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/kldrc.htm.
37
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 Sess., at 52-53 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html.
38
See generally Hague Convention, supra note 16 (neglecting to reference
dignity).
39
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
37, at 52-53.
40 Id. at 55.
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concern for human dignity, proposing that every "child should be
fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up
in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance,
freedom, equality and solidarity."4 1
That the dignitary principle informs the rest of the rights
recognized in these instruments can be intuited from the more
specific provisions. ICCPR Article 23(1) recognizes that every
child "is entitled to protection by society and the State, 4 2 and
Article 24(1) provides that "[e]very child shall have, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
his family, society and the State." 3 That article also provides that
every child has the right to a name, to be registered as born, and to
acquire a nationality.44 The non-discrimination provision is also
found in Article 2 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child,
which requires state parties to "take all appropriate measures to
ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination" based on his or her family's "status, activities,
expressed opinions, or beliefs."4 5
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) similarly
fleshes out these protections as they relate to adoption. Concern
for the adopted child's human dignity can be discerned in these
protections as well. The overarching substantive standard for
interpreting the child's rights is found in Article 3, which provides
that "the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration" for legal actions concerning children and that state
parties should "undertake to ensure the child such protection and
care as is necessary for his or her well-being," taking into account
the rights and duties of those legally responsible for the child.46 A
number of CRC provisions protect the child's relationship with his

41
42

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 167.
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note

37, at 55.
Id.
Id
45 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 167.
46 Id.
43

44

HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

2014

531

or her birthparents: Article 5 requires that states respect the rights

and duties of parents or extended family or community "in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, [and]
appropriate direction and guidance" in exercising the child's
rights. 47 Article 8 requires respect for the child's identity,
including family relations and name.4 ' Article 9 protects the child
from separation from his parents except when necessary for his or
her best interests and requires states to maintain the parent-child
relationship when separation is necessary. 49 Article 19 requires
state protection against childhood abuse or neglect,"o and Article
20 requires the state to protect a child who is deprived of his or her
family environment.si
The CRC also speaks to human rights requirements relating to
adoption. Article 20 requires that children separated from their
parents be ensured alternative care, listing adoption "or if
necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of
children."52 Article 21 of the CRC requires that adoption systems
make the best interests of the child paramount. It requires that
"competent authorities" make sure that adoption is appropriate and
that the parents or relevant parties be given counseling before
giving informed consent to adoption.54 It recognizes intercountry
adoption as permissible only if the child cannot be cared for in a
"suitable manner" in his or her country of origin, and provides for
parity between children adopted intercountry and those adopted
Moreover, it requires
domestically in the receiving nation.5
assurance that intermediaries and others do not receive "improper

financial gain."5
47 Id. at 168.
48

Id.
Id.
50 Id. at 169.
51 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 169.
52 Id
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id (explaining that intercountry adoption may be considered an alternative for
the child's care if suitable care with a foster or adoptive family or placement in the
country of origin may not be obtained, and a child of intercountry adoption will enjoy the
same safeguards and standards equivalent to national adoption cases).
56 Id
49
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The Hague Convention, although it does not specifically
reference the idea of "human dignity," is consistent with CRC
procedural protections, reiterating the "best interests of the child"
standard and noting that adoptions should proceed "with respect
for [the child's] fundamental rights." 57 It reiterates that it is the
duty of states to make sure that the child is adoptable and that
adoption is in his or her best interests after reviewing all possible
placements within the sending country (Article 4),ss to collect all
appropriate informed consent agreements (Article 4c),5 9 to ensure
that consent has not been obtained by compensation (Article
4c(3)),6 o and that the parents or responsible parties, and the child
where appropriate, have been counseled before their consent is
obtained (Article 4(c) (1), (2), and (d)). 6' Similarly, states are
required to counsel and determine the eligibility of the adoptive
parents to adopt and ensure that children will be allowed to enter
the receiving country (Article 5).62
Scholars of intercountry adoption, most prominently David
Smolin, have similarly talked about the importance of recognizing
dignitary rights of all members of the adoption triad, though
Smolin trains his critique primarily on recognizing the dignity of
the birth-parents and birth-family.6 3 For example, he argues,
"[u]nder international human rights norms, birth parents are
possessed of equal and inalienable rights based on their inherent
dignity as human persons. _From this perspective, extreme poverty
is not simply a background condition or circumstance, but in itself
represents a severe deprivation of human rights."" However, the
concept of human dignity as it relates to adoptions remains largely
unpacked.
The concept of human dignity as articulated in the human
rights instruments has been criticized as either meaningless or

57 Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl.
58 Id. art. 4(a)-(b).
59 Id. art. 4(c).
60 Id. art. 4(c)(3).
61 Id. art. 4(c)(1)-(2), (d).
62 Id. art. 5.

63 David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights
Analysis, 36 CAPITAL U. L. REv. 413, 438-39 (2007).
6 Id at 417.

2014

HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

533

elastic.65 Its defenders would argue that the concept is not
reducible to any one value, and it is not something that can be
"conferred" upon a person, because he or she already possesses
it.66 It is "a status which is first and to be taken for granted. It
refers to [humans'] highest value, or to the fact that they are a
presupposition for value, as they are those to whom value makes
sense." 67 We begin with human dignity as a given in any
conversation about the real or the good.
Yet, while there may be dangers in either defining or
instrumentalizing human dignity that these critiques fairly point
out, there are a cluster of traditionally recognized meanings that
help us to see how intercountry adoption can be a means to
ensuring the human dignity of a child. These include the right to
be "seen" as a person worthy of dignity, the right to autonomous
decision-making and to be heard on those decisions, the right to be
treated as of equal worth,6 and the right to flourish as a free
person, which includes both the right to the opportunity to grow
(or, in the terms of the Convention, to develop) and the right to the
opportunity to love and be loved.6 9
While the ancient concept of dignity as inhering in a person
because of his or her station has largely been discarded in favor of
equality discourse, there is one salient feature of the ancient
understanding that we should recognize: the concept of dignitas
was a relational concept, one that understands that society is
seeing and evaluating the person, and there is some relationship
between how one is valued and what one is due, i.e., what
individuals and society must do for the person who possesses

65 See, e.g., Zachary R. Calo, Human Dignity and Health Law: Personhood in
Recent Bioethical Debates, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 473, 473-76

(2012) (describing critics' view of the concept of human dignity as "useless" and
"malleable"); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183, 186 (2011) (describing the concept as "important but slippery").
66 Mette Lebech, What Is Human Dignity?, MAYNOOTH PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1

(2004), availableat http://eprints.nuim.ie/392/1/HumanDignity.pdf
67 Id. at 1; see also Rao, supra note 65, at 187 ("[D]ignity focuses on the inherent
worth of each individual. Such dignity exists merely by virtue of a person's humanity
and does not depend on intelligence, morality or social status.").
68 Rao, supra note 65, at 187 (describing intrinsic dignity as "a presumption of
human equality--each person is born with the same quantum of dignity").
69 See infra Sec. IV and accompanying text.
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dignity.70 "Dignity as recognition" acknowledges that "[a]n
individual's personality, and therefore his dignity, is constituted
and confirmed by society . . ;" "it is a dignity of difference, of

recognition for individual and group differences .... Unlike
inherent or intrinsic dignity, such dignity depends on external
affirmation to validate and confirm a person's worth.'
The first implication of this right to recognition or to be "seen"
is the duty of others to pay one notice, to take cognizance of the
rights-holder as a whole person. 2 While for the ancients, the
virtues or standing of the person is what merits respect, for
modern children and their parents, both birth and adoptive, the
point is that they should be recognized by institutions, societies
and governments (including international law) for who they are.
The second concept, which is really the focal point of both the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention
as they pertain to adoption, is the right to autonomy in the Kantian
sense, i.e., the right of individuals to make choices as independent
persons, i.e., the recognition that "they are capable of legislating
the moral law unto themselves," which is the essence of the
dignity of their nature.74 In legal parlance, this meaning of dignity
is legislated in what are effectively the "informed consent"
provisions of both conventions.75 They require that the parents or
designated caretakers of adoptable children be informed,
counseled about their options, and permitted to make a noncoerced choice about adoption, with coercion defined both in
terms of legal and social pressure and in terms of economic
pressure, i.e., offering financial incentives to cause parental

70 Lebech, supra note 66, at 3 (describing dignitasas the "standing of the one who
commanded respect, whether because of his political, military or administrative
achievements").
71 Rao, supra note 65, at 248 (noting the constitutional courts' understanding of
dignity depends "on recognition by others in the political and social
community[,] ... the
attitude possessed
by both
the state
and other
individuals[,] . .. [and is a status] constituted and confirmed by society") (emphasis in
original).
72 Id. at 249 (referring to the idea as the "politics of recognition").
73 Id at 224.
74 Lebech, supra note 66, at 6.
75 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 21(a); Hague
Convention, supra note 16, art. 4.
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consent for adoption.76 The Hague Convention also requires the
child's informed consent where appropriate.77
A third, modem concept of dignity assumes that humans must
be treated as of equal worth. This concept perhaps can be said to
be founded on the Christian concept of dignity as inhering in a
human being by virtue of his or her creation in the image of God,
which would suggest that it is impossible to value one human
being more highly than another." In Aquinas's view, a person
could lose his dignity by "deviat[ing] from the rational order by
sinning," but could also recover that dignity through finding
redemption in Christ. 79 The recognition of an inviolable right to
be treated of equal worth, which subsumes Kant's view that
persons must always be treated as ends, and never as means,
causes difficulties in situations like adoption when treating all
persons as persons of equal worth is bound to lead to conflict.so
On the one hand, it does demand that the international community
provide for the basic sustenance needs of the child, protecting his
right to "life" and "survival."' On the other, it is difficult to treat
every person as both inviolable and of equal worth in conditions of
material and non-material scarcity-that is, basically all of real
life-as evidenced by any problem in which political decisionmakers are faced with the prospect of granting benefits to some to
the detriment of others.8 2 It is arguable that the Conventions'
focus on "the best interests of the child" is a violation of this
concept of dignity, because it projects the worth of the adoptable
child as paramount to the worth of any other persons affected by a
proposed adoption.

Bartholet, supra note 9, at 173.
Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(d) (requiring that authorities from the
country of origin, depending on the child's maturity and age, ensure the child has been
counseled about the effects of an adoption and has provided his or her consent if it is
required).
78 See Lebech, supra note 66, at 5 (noting that dignity "was after all given twice,
first in Creation and again, but now even better, in Redemption, after it was marred by
sin," and that this "reinforc[es] the recognition of the personhood and human dignity of
everyone").
79 Id.
80 See id at 8.
81 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 6.
82 See Lebech, supra note 66, at 8.
76

77
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Finally, the concept of dignity presumes what the early
international instruments described as "freedom" 3 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child describes as
"development,"84 that is, the right of the person to grow and
flourish in freedom. This concept goes beyond autonomy in the
sense of free moral decision-making and focuses on conditions
that permit or prevent the development of human faculties and
personality." Minimally, principles of recognition, equal respect,
and freedom guard against blatant types of abuse and exploitation
that intercountry adoption skeptics focus on-e.g., children should
not be sold, or in the language of the Hague Convention,
"trafficked," and should not adopted into abusive or neglectful
environments, where they may be physically or emotionally
damaged by deliberate wrongful behavior or lack of care by their
parents.86
III. Principles for Intercountry Adoption Following from
Human Dignity
A. The Realism Principle
Many advocates in the intercountry adoption debate have
argued for what Richard Carlson has called "clear-eyed realism"
in both recognizing the nature of the problem that adoption
addresses and in understanding the limits of the law in addressing
it." Yet, realism is hard to come by, either with respect to
describing "the facts on the ground" or in understanding the nature
of what the law does or can do.
In cases such as the Russian adoption controversy, it is

83 See id. at 6 (arguing that the dignity of man consists in the freedom to choose
his or her manner of existence).
84 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, pmbl. (describing the
rights of the child as including the "full and harmonious development of [the child's]
personality").
85 See id.

86 Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. (describing the necessity of ensuring
that intercountry adoption is in the best interests of the child, including respect for the
child's fundamental rights and preventing the abduction, sale, or trafficking in children).
87 Carlson, supra note 33, at 767 (arguing that reform must be tempered with
clear-eyed realism; for example, the need to understand that adoption corruption in
foreign nations will sometimes be beyond control or detection).
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tempting for both pro- and anti-intercountry adoption advocates to
charge that the other side is not willing to acknowledge the "facts"
about adoptable children and their situation-that, for example,
many Russian children languish in unsuitable orphanages or that
American parents have sometimes abused their children or proven
incapable of adequately coping with children who sustained
significant emotional damage before they were adopted."
One reason for this is that the political debate on intercountry
adoption, attempting to explain a proposed solution, isolates one
subset of facts in a very complex context, which includes many
different geographical and cultural contexts in both sending and
receiving nations, not to mention the innumerable individual
situations in which adoptable children might find themselves. Of
course, rule of law presumptions that counsel for clarity,
consistency, and certainty are only possible when human
dilemmas are oversimplified. Thus, each side in this debate
focuses on a small subset of facts as the only relevant ones for
constructing guiding legal principles, to the exclusion of other
"facts" that may be equally verifiable.
In such a complex situation, labeling isolated parts of such a
context as "facts" gives them an authority as dispositive to
resolution of legal problems that is undeserved. Moreover, such
relabeling intentionally ignores inconvenient realities that do not
fit into the narrative of "facts" that the advocate is constructing, or
even worse, obscures the inevitable reality that such narratives
contain value assumptions about what "facts" have priority in the
decision to construct a legal regime.8 For example, in the Russian
adoption case, the standard Russian news media's careful crafting
of stories to illustrate abusive practices of a small number of
American children was apparently unaccompanied by media
recognition of the conditions of institutionalized Russian
88 See Wendy Koch, U.S. Seeks to Defuse Russia Adoption Flap, USA TODAY
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-04-12-Russiaadoptions N.htm (describing about a dozen publicized cases of Russian children killed
or abused by their adoptive parents in the U.S., including a recent case of the U.S.
mother who sent her adopted Russian son alone back to Russia); see also Amid Proposed
Adoption Ban, supra note 7 (describing UNICEF's approval of Russia's attempt to
improve the child welfare system and acknowledging UNICEF's appeal to Russia to give
priority attention to the plight of Russian children in institutions).
89 See Bartholet,supra note 9, at 188.
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children.90 Conversely, media and adoption advocates have failed
to give an accurate picture of the challenges that emotionally and
physically deprived orphans present to unsuspecting adoptive
families without substantial resources to cope with them.9 1 Of
course, any legal regime has to be built on some narrative; but it is
important to always keep in mind that even the broadest narrative
will simplify a complex situation.
The first consequence of the human dignity principle is that the
law should take into account and respond to the complexities
facing intercountry adoption and openly acknowledge the extent to
which solutions to these complexities are based on the
prioritization of certain values (e.g., the best interests of the child).
This may seem obvious, yet it is too often ignored in practice.92
Those realities include a broken international social and economic
system in which material and non-material inequalities and
deprivations put significant strain on the ability of families of
origin to raise their children to adulthood, a brokenness which has
disastrous consequences for birth families (as, for example,
Professors Smolin and King acknowledge)9 3 and for children (as,
for example, Professors Bartholet and Dillon acknowledge).9 4
They also include, in some and perhaps many cases, wrongful or
neglectful parental behavior or inadequate parenting skills that
contribute to the precarious situation of adoptable children.95 They
include social indifference to the situation of adoptable children,

90 Levy, supra note 5 (describing the Russian broadcast of an interview between
the Federal Children's Ombudsman and the child sent back to Russia by his adoptive
mother). See also Koch, supra note 88 (explaining that it is not uncommon for adopted
children who spent years living in Russian orphanages to behave in ways adoptive
parents find challenging because of their orphanage experiences).
91 Id. (noting that the mother who returned her adoptive son claimed Russian
orphanage workers misled her about her son's violent and severe psychopathic issues).
92 Carlson, supra note 33, at 772-75.
93 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 63, at 415-16.
94 See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 9, at 180 (discussing damaging, lifelong harms
inflicted upon children in non-family placements); Dillon, supra note 32, at 183-85
(noting that millions of children will never be brought up in their biological families).
95

See e.g., GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND

LESBIAN PARENST IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007) (noting the large numbers of U.S.

children who are in the foster care system because of parental abuse or neglect, and the
transition from foster care to adoption).
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as journalists in Russia have documented.9 6 They also include a
host of other factors.
Respect for human dignity requires balanced realism, the
willingness to see all of these forms of brokenness, precisely
because it requires each person involved in an adoption situation
to be recognized and to be seen for what he or she is. Professor
Smolin's work clearly grasps this first meaning of the dignitary
principle, in that he demands that the adoption system not look
away from the violations of the human rights of birth parents who
are so impoverished that they would consider giving up cherished
children to survive.97 Similarly, the United Nation's position
paper on separated refugee children, which attempts to describe
protocols for reuniting such children with their parents, focuses its
line of sight on one aspect of intercountry adoption.9 8 But, as
Smolin and all others in the debate likely would acknowledge, not
all parents whose children are being placed for adoption are
making this choice from economic necessity, nor are adoptable
children refugees.9 9 To focus our attention on one subset of the
universe of adoptable children, or just on children, or just on birth
parents and children, is to disrespect parties' rights to
recognition. 00
Thus, proposals for reform of intercountry
adoption laws should be nuanced and limited to those
circumstances and individuals to whom they apply.

96 See Koch, supra note 88.
97 David M. Smolin, Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 81, 93 (2006); Shani King, Challenging
Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think About Intercountry
Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 413, 441-43 (2009) (describing treatment of birth parents
as "invisible" and as "unworthy of keeping their children, or willingly relinquish[ing]
their rights for a few bucks").
98 See, e.g., UNHCR Policy on Adoption, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

1-2 (Aug. 22, 1995), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42f9c3714.html
(noting UNCHR policy that "refugee children in an emergency context are not available
for adoption" and adherence to the Hague Convention to protect against "the abduction,
sale of or traffic in children"); see also Bartholet, supra note 9, at 156 (noting UNICEF
influence on restricting intercountry adoption).
99 David M. Smolin, Child Laundering as Exploitation: Applying Anti-Trafficking
Norms to IntercountryAdoption Under the Coming Hague Regime, 32 VT. L. REv. 1, 8
(2007). See also UNHCR Policy on Adoption, supra note 98, at 1-2.
100 See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17 (recognizing
discrete rights of parents, children, and families).
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Respect for human dignity as a right of recognition counsels
that we must take members of the adoption triad and the
intermediaries that serve them as they are, not as idealistic
children's rights advocates or family planners might wish them to
be. For example, some seemingly want to construct adoption
processes to ensure that children are never adopted intercountry. 0
For some, that means excluding single (or older or gay or
disabled) adoptive parents, for example, based on research about
the relative success of children in single parent homes.' 0 2 Lynn
Wardle, for example, counsels against placement of children in
homes of single parents, when possible, based on documentation
of their relative vulnerability that children in two-parent homes do
not display.'
However, as many adoption professionals have come to
realize, there is no one "perfect" kind of home for all adopted
children. For example, older children who come to their adoptive
families with emotional scars may feel more secure in a singleparent situation where they are not vying with other parents or
children for the attention and loyalty of their parent.'04 Children
who have struggled in the homes of their families of origin may
find themselves to be better parented by gay or disabled parents
who have similarly struggled with social projections of
"normalcy" than with "perfect" couples who have never
undergone such struggles.'os Parents can offer love and security
even if they are not well educated, well off, or even well schooled
in parenting techniques.
Although it may seem idealistic rather than realistic to say so,
human dignity requires that those who spar over the best way to
protect family life and children must never treat individual
101 See, e.g., King, supra note 97, at 463 (noting that the "European Parliament has
taken the position that intercountry adoption violates the human rights of children and
has sought to make outlawing intercountry adoption a condition of joining the European
Union").
102 Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness:Adoption Problems, Paradigms,Policies, and
Parameters,4 WHITTIER J. CHILD& FAM. ADVOC., 323, 364-71 (2005).
103 Id. at 324, 373.

104 See King, supra note 97, at 466-67 (describing caregiving relationships that are
seen by Western culture as nontraditional, and examining the benefits of these
relationships).
105

See id
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children as means to a political or ideological end. This is a
realistic principle because it focuses on the actual situation of
children and their families rather than on theoretical or historical
For example, adoption
objections to intercountry adoption.'o
scholars like Shani King may have some valid concerns that
intercountry or interracial adoption needs to be evaluated for, and
purged of, historically conditioned but still-existing imperialistic
assumptions and processes as adoption changes.o 7 Yet, human
dignity per Kant requires, as Elizabeth Bartholet has argued, 0 8
that children should not become hostages of larger social and
political battles that nations or ethnic, racial, religious, or
geographical communities are waging.109 Moreover, they should
not become casualties of the various ideological battles that
intellectuals are waging, whether they are about racism or Western
hegemony, often without returning to the question of what real
children living in these conditions today need." 0
The demands of human dignity do not require intellectuals,
advocates or even nation-states to cease their critique of the social
or political realities of either "sending" or "receiving" countries in
adoption. In fact, just the opposite is true-critique of national
and local practices is not simply warranted, but mandated." The
right of recognition simply asks governments to act promptly and
fairly in the interests of children in response to existing "facts on
the ground" without necessarily accepting as future givens the
assumptions that have created these "facts on the ground."" 2 As
Bartholet and other advocates of intercountry and other nontraditional forms of adoption have noted, there is an emergency
here."' Children need to be helped now and it is not acceptable
either to put children's lives on hold until adoption law reform is

106

Compare King, supra note 97, at 414-15, with Bartholet, supra note 9, at 159-

64.
107 King, supranote 97, at 414-15.
108 See Bartholet,supra note 9, at 159-64.
109 See id
110
III
112

King, supranote 97, at 414-15.
See Rao, supranote 65, at 243-44.
See id.

113 Bartholet, supra note 9, at 160-61, 163-64 (describing crisis in China as a result
of one child rule).
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accomplished, or to create adoption procedures that make children
languish in damaging families or institutions.
The principle of subsidiarity can function effectively here to
protect the right of recognition if it is correctly understood. As
Professor Carlson has pointed out, many of the most visible
players who have put their thumb on the scale against intercountry
adoption argue that the principle of subsidiarity requires
exhausting all possible placements for a child within his home
country before intercountry adoption can take place."14
As a principle of Catholic social thought, subsidiarity is not a
rigid preference for localism or nationalism. Rather, it states that
"nothing should be done by a larger and more complex
organization which can be done as well by a smaller and simpler
organization."" 5 The principle implies that the local or national
solution to the problem of adoptable children must be at least as
effective as the international solution at accomplishing its task,
here, creating an environment where children do not only exist but
thrive."' The principle of subsidiarity further assumes that an
individual is more likely to be recognized for who he is, and thus
to be treated with human dignity, in a small-scale environment
where actual human beings can come to know him in all his
complexity." 7
In a context in which the search for intracountry placements
can occur in weeks or a few months, for example, where
placement alternatives are available in a searchable database and
inquiries can be made quickly, the principle of subsidiarity seems
unobjectionable as potentially lessening the amount of material
114 Carlson, supra note 33, at 772-75.
115

David A. Bosnich, The Principle of Subsidiary, ACTON INSTITUTE RELIGION &

LIBERTY (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-6-number4/principle-subsidiarity (emphasis added).
116 For a description of the current understanding of the principle of subsidiarity as
applied to adoption, see Carlson, supra note 34, at 735-36 (discussing a "strict" view of
subsidiarity that requires the sending nation to exhaust all local placement options before
permitting intercountry adoption and more moderate views).
117 See Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, http://www.vatican.val
holyfather/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf ben-xvi enc_20090629_caritas-inveritate en.html (noting that "[s]ubsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in
the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to others. By
considering reciprocity as the heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the
most effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state.").
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and cultural disruption for the child. On the other hand, if a child
will be placed in a situation where he is at risk not only for
survival but also at risk of being "unseen," unrecognized in an
unregulated and unsubsidized institution for years because
placement options are not easily searchable, or because of slowpaced bureaucracy, facile employment of the subsidiarity principle
can pose grave harm to real children, harm that will follow them
throughout their lives."' For example, Professor Bartholet writes
movingly about the psychological damage inflicted on infants
whose cries for attention are not heeded for hours because
attendants are not available to respond."19
Again, the right of recognition also requires that we take into
consideration the actual situation of each individual child rather
than setting rigid international timelines as the UNICEF statement
on adoption of refugee children does-a two-year wait for a nineyear-old to be adopted poses very different risks than a two-year
wait for an infant to be adopted.'20
While international adoption advocates and scholars have been
realistic about the difficulties of adoption, this realism has
sometimes been divorced from practical planning that has a
realistic chance of resolving the crisis that they spotlight as a
justification for intercountry adoption.
For example, some
adoption advocates have been realistic about the conditions which
adoptable children face, but have not fully faced up to the limited
role that intercountry adoption can play in improving those
conditions, given the enormous numbers of children without
parents and the complications of moving even one child from his
country of birth to his country of adoption.' 2 ' Focusing on "their
issue," they may not join forces to advocate for other measures,
l1i Carlson, supra note 33, at 737-40; see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 182
(describing the lack of prospective adopters in the poorest countries in the world).
119 Bartholet, supra note 9, at 191.
120 See Carlson, supra note 34, at 774 (explaining that waiting can cause children
significant harm if they lose their opportunity for early family bonding by remaining too
long in institutional care); see also Bartholet, supra note 9, at 190 (noting that in South
and Central America, infants are not made available for adoption, but often languish for
two or three years in damaging institutions).
121 See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 182; see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 198
(noting that international adoption can play only a limited role in responding to the
world's poor).
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including foster and extended family care, which can provide
permanent care for the larger number of parentless children who
will never be adopted no matter how open international adoption
law becomes, a problem in virtually every country in the world.'2 2
On the other side, too much so-called "realism" about
dramatically reported intercountry adoption abuses, including
baby-selling practices, abusive adoptive parents and the like has
caused intercountry adoption skeptics to successfully demand
more regulation of adoptions, including the regulation of fees that
drive parents and intermediaries.123 Again, suggesting that these
abuses are representative and should drive the law of international
adoption is not "realistic" or in line with the demands of human
dignity because it uses children as a means to an end.124 For
example, on the subject of the economics of adoption, most
"realism" literature focusing on "baby-selling" and human
trafficking reports has demanded that the economic system not
incentivize birth parents, intermediaries or adoptive parents to
complete an adoptionl 2 5-intermediaries are considered too eager
to exploit birth or adoptive parents with economic incentives, and
the mark of whether an adoption is "loving" on the side of both
birth and adoptive parents is whether they are willing to sacrifice
on behalf of their children.126
. Yet, economics plays a role, if not the primary role, for all
members of the adoption triad. To suggest or pretend that
economics should not play any role is to challenge the dignitary
right of the person, whether a birth-parent, an adoptive parent or
an intermediary, to make autonomous decisions, to live as a
morally self-regulating person who can legitimately consider the
actual consequences of a decision to his life and the lives of those
around him.127
For example, even the most altruistic
122 See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 158 (suggesting alternatives such as foster care,
orphanages, and UNICEF programs).
123 Id at 188; see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 185 (describing how adoption law
functions as an enemy to children by setting up barriers to international adoption).
124

Id. at 186-87.

125 David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System
Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnaping, and
Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 127 (2006).

126 Smolin, supra note 63, at 418-21.
127 See Lebech, supra note 66, at 6.
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intermediaries have to make a living, so nation-states addressing
abusive and exploitative intermediary fees still need to leave
regulatory room for feasible business models that will not
discourage valuable intercountry adoptions.128 A proper model in
a nation where government highly subsidizes the care of adoptable
children and the adoption process will not work in a nation where
that is not possible. 2 9 International funding agencies should also
consider how to provide appropriate economic incentives, whether
through direct government subsidies, underwriting private
agencies, tax breaks, or other means that will result in the creation
and flourishing of intermediaries that engage in adoption "best
practices," particularly in those nations without a history of viable
and ethical adoption organizations.
Similarly, the dignitary principle of moral autonomy embraces
more than the concept of informed consent recognized in the
adoption instruments-for example, that a birthparent or adoptable
child should know and be counseled about the realities of his or
her choices. It also asks us to show respect for the decisions that
both birth and adoptive parents make, including those made in part
based upon economic considerations.' 30 It is a rare birth parent for
whom the economic cost of raising a child is not in play, and
similarly, a rare adoptive parent for whom it is not a consideration
for adoption.' 3 ' To disrespect the moral choice of a desperately
poor parent who makes the choice for adoption by suggesting that
it must be uninformed, coerced, immoral, or otherwise less worthy
of respect because it is made in part for economic reasons violates
that parent's human dignity, just as much as it would to demand
that an adoptive parent accept a child that he or she wisely
determined he or she was not capable of parenting.
Again, the adoption community seems to consider the way
economics can influence adoption decisions only as a basis to
discourage adoption, by excoriating all economic considerations of

128 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 63, at 438-39.
129 See id. at 452 ("The solution to this dilemma necessarily would have to vary
with the particular circumstances of each significant sending nation.").
130 See Lebech, supra note 66, at 6.
131 See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 187-88 (describing circumstances of poverty and
suggesting that birth parents "may have one or two children they are struggling to keep
alive, and know they are incapable of supporting a third.").
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birthparents or adoptive parents as "baby-selling" or "monetizing"
the child.'32 Instead, the partially economic nature of adoption
decisions should push nation-states and the international
community to consider how economic motivations can incentivize
a "good" adoption in the right way, not only how they can
incentivize a "bad" adoption in the wrong way.'
In a country
like Russia where children often end up in orphanages, it may be
appropriate to provide incentives to birth parents to surrender their
children to adoption rather than orphanages if those are the only
two realistic options.'3 4 These incentives need not be substantial
cash payments that might easily morph into actual baby-sellingone might instead envision, for example, providing the economic
means for the Russian mother to keep in touch with and perhaps
even visit that adopted child as he grows up so she feels less like
she is abandoning him to an unknown fate.'
On the adoptive
parent side, for example, in the United States, economic incentives
may take the form of providing realistic tax deductions or credits
for parents who adopt special needs children or adopt from
countries with protocols requiring extra expense.13 6
Similarly, most nation states are likely to make decisions on
both adoption procedures and economic support based on a mix of
reasons, some of them motivated by concern for displaced children
and others by a desire to pass off responsibility for the care of their
children or to hone some political image in the world community.
Any system or set of values that ignores the complexity of these
motivations is unlikely to be good at putting children in the best

132 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 13, at 311-14 (discussing ways in which economic
incentives for birth parents to relinquish effectively amount to induce child trafficking).
133 See King, supra note 97, at 464-65.
134 See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 191-92 (describing the conditions of some
orphanages, and advocating for adoption over foster care and orphanage placement).
135 See, e.g., King, supra note 97, at 464-65 (advocating for programs that would
aid parents who are "temporarily unable to care for their children").
136 Currently, U.S. taxpayers can take a maximum tax credit up to $10,000 per
adopted child. See 26 U.S.C. § 23(a)-(b) (2013). For most international adoptions, this
is far too low to cover the costs of adoption, particularly when the adopted child has
special needs. See, e.g., Susan Freivalds, InternationalAdoption: What You Need to
Know to Begin the Process, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/

articles.php?aid=686 (estimating that intercountry adoptions cost from $15,000 to over
$40,000).
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possible environments given available resources."' Scholars of
the history of the idea of dignity note that one of its streams has
been institutional dignity, the idea that communities and nations
"have" dignity, and that certain practices, such as torture or
prostitution, may violate the dignity of these communities and
nations, even when individuals involved in those practices
consent.'3 8 The institutional dignitary principle requires that we
look at the institutions and governments that regulate the adoption
process with clear eyes, both accepting their resource, social, and
political limitations and confronting them honestly about how well
they meet international standards for the protection of children,
particularly under the Convention of the Rights of the Child and
the Hague Convention on Adoption.'3 9 On both national and
international levels, this means basic oversight of those who
facilitate adoptions to ensure that they are meeting the minimal
standards of the conventions.'4 0 If nothing else, this is important
because, as Professor Bartholet says, even the occasional
sensational abuse, which sometimes, if rarely, occurs in private
adoption, often results in over-regulation and moratoriums on
adoption, as the Russian ban on American adoptions evidences.' 4 '
However, as with parents and intermediaries, critique need not
only be found in negative or regulatory approaches to evaluations
of countries' approaches to compliance with the international
covenants. If there is such a thing as institutional dignity, all
nations of the world have a commitment to support those nations
who struggle to meet the standards because of their own internal
limitations.'4 2 History shows that simply shaming countries with
poor child welfare and adoption practices through exposure has
more often served to dry up adoption rather than improve those
137 See, e.g., King, supra note 97, at 423-24 (describing how the motivation of
adoption shifted "from the altruistic, finding a home for a parentless child, to the supply
and demand economics of finding children for childless couples" in America in the
1960s and 1970s).
138 Rao, supra note 65, at 228-30.
139 See id. at 235-41.
140 See id.
141 Bartholet, supra note 9, at 174 (explaining that preventing baby-selling or other
adoption abuses may help to reduce adoption scandals, which trigger anti-adoption
reforms that significantly reduce the number of legitimate adoptions).
142 See Rao, supra note 65, at 235-41.
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practices for children in their jurisdiction.143 Perhaps recognition
and support of positive efforts for change can have the opposite
effect.144 For example, an independently organized Intercountry
Adoption Agency could seek private and governmental funding to
reward "best practices" of countries that design protocols and
standards that effectively and fairly move children from home to
home with the least disruption and, especially for adoptable
infants, as close to their birth as possible.145 Similarly, countries
with particularly abysmal practices that have made great strides
forward could be recognized, economically or otherwise, for their
efforts. Even modest amounts of funding awarded to honor "best
practices" would serve as a symbolic incentive to all nations to
push themselves toward more humane child welfare and adoption
systems.
Analyzing the literature, it seems doubtful that UNICEF, or
any other U.N. agency currently serving the needs of children, is
in a viable position to turn this situation around-to pull back on
the overregulation and bureaucratization of intercountry adoption
that has resulted from undue responsiveness to reactive popular
media portrayals of intercountry adoption that have been further
skewed by internal politics or national xenophobia. Existing
private agencies and coalitions like UNICEF may now be too
closely identified with one country's citizens' self-interest or with
one position in the ideological battle over adoption.146 Evidence of
that fact can be found in the change in UNICEF's attitude toward
the value of intercountry adoption as politics have changed within

the department.14 7
By contrast, a truly independent agency, focused not simply on

143 Bartholet, supra note 9, at 160 (describing the political forces that shamed South
Korea at the 1988 Seoul Olympics and changed the internal political discussion about
intercountry adoption).
144 See id. at 168-69 (examining recent U.S. adoption legislation that may affect
adoption in the long term).
I45

See id.

Bartholet, supra note 9, at 155-56, 166 (noting that UNICEF has recently issued
statements indicating a large number of adoptions from any particular country should be
a "red flag" about the country's practices, and acknowledging that sending countries'
decisions on adoption are influenced, among other things, by UNICEF).
147 Id. at 156 (noting the major role that UNICEF has played in recent attempts to
restrict international adoption).
146
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regulation but also on improving intercountry adoption, could not
only reward "best practices" but also engage in research and
development of these practices for intracountry adoptions that
could result in subsequent improvements to existing conventions.
It could also mediate political controversies between nation-states
about intercountry adoption, consult with such nations on their
implementation of Hague Convention protocols as they intersect
with other children's rights in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other documents, and challenge all nation-states to meet
the goals of the CRC and the Hague Convention to ensure every
child the opportunity to grow up in a family.
B. The Global Interdependence Principle
A second recognition in international adoption rights law
should be that the world is now, and increasingly, interdependent.
If companies are going to be economically viable, they must
conform to international and foreign legal norms, in addition to the
norms within their own nations, because markets for certain goods
have changed.
National media in many countries explore
international crises on a scale that is interchangeable with that for
national and local stories, rather than relegating them to a back
page.' 48 Increasingly, young people are engaged in international
travel and foreign study, once a luxury reserved for wealthy
children, as an expected part of their education, starting at high
school age or even before.'4 9 Perhaps as importantly, adolescents
and young adults are beginning to view themselves as citizens of
the world as much as of their respective nations.
The recognition of global interdependence entails two
principles important for adoption law. The first is a principle that
148 See, e.g., Jarol Manheim & Robert B. Albritton, Changing National Images:
International Public Relations and Media Agenda Setting, 78 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 641,
641-42 (1984) (describing the use of public relations consultants by nations and the
media-influenced "agenda-setting framework," consisting of the media, public, and
policymakers and highlighting the common coverage of international stories and its
impact on policies, which affect a nation's position on whether to allow foreign adoption
of its children).
149 Adriana Medina-Lopez-Portillo, Intercultural Learning Assessment: The Link
Between Program Duration and the Development ofIntercultural Sensitivity, 10
FRONTIERS: INTERDISC. J. STUD. ABROAD 179 (2004) (noting the "growing emphasis on
internationalizing higher education and [] rapidly increasing numbers of students
embarking on study abroad programs each year").
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few would contest, but most are not willing to implement: the
entire world is responsible (and should be held responsible) for the
welfare of adoptable children throughout the world, with due
respect for the scarcity of economic resources to meet those needs,
the limitations of international intervention, and the proper roles of
birth families and state institutions in caring for them.
Second, perhaps more controversially, adoptable children
should be able to call on the international community to denounce
adoption shutdowns, like Russia's, as violations of their right to
non-discrimination based on ethnic origin and social status under
treaties such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
1. The Consequences of Global Interdependencefor
GovernmentalResponsibilitiesfor Adoptable
Children
In the adoption context, the recognition of global
interdependence should be embodied in an international
commitment to working toward the day when every child has a
family or family equivalent, regardless of the child's nationality
and regardless of where that family lives. Since the advent of
intercountry adoption, American adoptions have been largely
ethnocentric, focused on assisting American families who wish to
adopt, rather than on supporting the needs of adoptable children
where they live.so The State Department has also policed the
immigration of children from other countries based on political
assumptions about which international children might be a burden
rather than a benefit to the nation. 5' For example, the State
Department has enforced the statutory restriction barring
admission of persons with communicable diseases 52 against

150 Smolin, supra note 99, at 53.
151 Not only do HIV positive children face difficulties in entering the United States,
but all children must also have a skin test for TB. Elisabeth Pernicone, AIDS and
Adoption-Part 2: Adopting an HIV-Positive Child, THE AIDS BEACON,
http://www.aidsbeacon.com/news/2009/10/08/aids-and-adoption-part-two-adopting-anhiv-positive-child/. If the TB test is positive, a lung tissue culture must be taken and
must come back negative before the child can enter the United States. Id. Until recently,
this test could take up to eight weeks but there has been recent approval of a "rapid test"
that can take three days. Id.
152 See 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(1)(A) (2013).
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children with HIV or AIDS who have identified adoptive parents
in the United States.1 53
American federal and state government adoption laws, as well
as those of other countries, should fully recognize that national
borders have become more fluid, and that people interact across
them with relative ease in other areas of public life, such as
commercial ventures and higher education opportunities.
Adoption should not be an exception to this flow across borders.154
The ratification of the Hague Convention on Intercountry
Adoption by the United States and other countries is a step toward
that recognition. 155 However, it is not a substantive practical
commitment by the United States or other signatories ensuring
that, to the extent possible, every child in the world is guaranteed
his rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
particularly his rights under Articles 20 and 21 to adoption and
foster care where appropriate. 156 The global interdependence
principle suggests that the U.S., among other wealthy nations, has
more than a moral responsibility; indeed, it has an international
legal responsibility to assist those nations that are struggling to
provide families for their displaced children.
David Smolin has offered perhaps the most challenging
proposal to make this aspiration a reality. Smolin, like others,
notes the vast amount of resources American parents spend in
adopting children, while scores of other children struggle in their
families of origin or languish in orphanages or other poor
conditions.'"'
He has argued that a global commitment to
adoptable children would be most easily met if some of the

153 Pernicone, supra note 151 (explaining that people with tuberculosis and HIV
have communicable diseases, according to the CDC, and that they are forbidden from
traveling to the United States, even if already adopted).
154 See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, supra note 9 (noting that the interests of the
child may sometimes be in favor of adoption and recommending reform that facilitates
rather than impedes such adoptions).
155 Wilkening, supra note 4, at 1045-46.
156 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 20(1), (3) (noting that
these children "shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the
State" and that "such care could include . .. foster placement [or] . . . adoption").

157 Smolin, supra note 99, at 16-17; see also Bartholet,supra note 8, at 190 (noting
cost of international adoption at $15,000-$30,000 and high economic and time barriers to
international adoption).
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resources now spent to further intercountry adoptions by
Americans could be channeled into supporting children's families
of origin.s15 Essentially, he argues for a surcharge on adoption
fees, which would go to other birth families in an adopted child's
sending nation to incentivize them not to give up their children
because of poverty.15 9
Smolin is surely correct in arguing that Americans have been
myopic and selfish about economic disparities between the First
and Third Worlds, preferring to spend most of their resources on
what they perceive will benefit them and their immediate circle
(adoption) rather than what might benefit more of the world's
children (i.e., charity or foreign aid). As a matter of social justice
more broadly, it is hard to argue with him-there is no justice in a
world in which some are born with the resources to spend tens of
thousands of dollars on making or adopting a child, while others
cannot feed the children they have.
However, the mechanism Smolin proposes for recognizing a
global responsibility to the world's children proves somewhat
problematic, as Professor Carlson points out,160 and probably does
not adequately take into account the mixed motivations of those in
the adoption community. If adoptive parents were completely
motivated by altruism, most would probably recognize the
dilemma Smolin poses and distribute their economic resources
more broadly and less selfishly to meet the needs of the world's
children.161 Even if they were primarily motivated by altruism and
donated their money rather than adopting, there is no guarantee
that either private gifts or government funding aimed at displaced
children and their families would go to them, given the overbureaucratization, corruption, and less-than-desirable competence
in many private and public institutions dealing with children's
needs.16 2 Carson also notes there are difficult questions that arise
about how such money would be distributed and to which
families.163
158 Smolin, supra note 63, at 432-34.
159 Id. at 445-47.

160 Carlson, supra note 33, at 758-59.
161 Smolin, supra note 13, at 283.
162 Carlson, supra note 33, at 758.
163 Id. at 758-59.
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Furthermore, it is not clear that Smolin's proposal of a
surcharge on intercountry adoptions is a fair way to solve the
inequity he identifies. As Smolin, Carlson, and others note, some
intermediaries already impose a "tax" on existing adoptions in the
form of money or essentials that adoptive parents are expected to
bring to foreign orphanages when they pick up their children.'" In
the current system, in which such a gift is expected, an
intermediary can logically argue that an adoptive parent gets some
benefit from this "tax" because the orphanage might go out of
existence but for the fee, thus drying up adoptive parents' access
to adoptable children.' 65
Adding an additional "gift" or fee to make it possible for other
birth-parents to keep their children may seem like "double
taxation" in these cases. It also might discourage American
parents from undertaking international adoption for fear that their
own adoptions might be disrupted by the incentive scheme.'66
Moreover, it is somewhat perverse to further "tax" those parents
who are already offering to support an adoptive child for whom
they would otherwise have had no responsibility, while other
citizens in both the sending and receiving nations take little or no
responsibility for these children, whether they can afford to or
not. 6 1 Imposing an additional tax on adoptive parents further
reinforces the "market" model because it underscores the reality
that these American parents are so desperate to have a child that
they are more willing to pay such a tax than others who have no
interest in caring for the world's children in crisis.
One theoretical alternative to Smolin's proposal is simply to
recognize that the United States morally "owes" sending nations
more foreign aid just because they are poor nations. Rather than
taxing U.S. adoptive parents, the adoption community might make
stronger efforts to enlist adoptive parents of third world children,
who may have an emotional investment in their children's
countries of origin, into efforts to increase foreign aid to these
For example, Professor Bartholet argues that
countries.168
164
165
166
167
168

See Carlson, supra note 33, at 755, 771; Smolin, supra note 13, at 318.
Carlson, supra note 33, at 754-55.
See Smolin, supra note 13, at 283.
Carlson, supra note 33, at 759.
See Bartholet, supra note 8, at 183 (noting, "[t]hese are families whose members
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adoptive parents of a child from Vietnam will have a stronger
emotional bond with that country than the average U.S. citizen.' 69
These parents may be more willing to lobby for foreign aid to feed
starving children and their parents in Vietnam, to encourage
private companies to develop the economy in their children's
homeland, and to encourage cooperative efforts between national
governments to protect and foster the development of children still
in orphanages or foster homes in Vietnam.'7 0
Alternatively, at least in theory, the international community
could acknowledge that the children of the world are, generally
speaking, ultimately net benefits (even if temporary liabilities) to
their nations and, in a non-monetized way, acknowledge that (as
some critics of intercountry adoption have argued) transferring a
child from a poor nation to a rich one is effectively transferring a
future national asset. However, rather than imposing the cost of
that transfer on the adoptive parents, who will already be doing
their part to feed, clothe, and raise a "national asset," the
international community could agree that receiving nations owe a

must learn to appreciate one another's differences," and, thus, the adoptive parents
develop bonds with adopted children's birth countries "in terms of racial and cultural
heritage, while at the same time experiencing their common humanity.").
169 See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 351 (noting the significance of these
"international adoptive families living in the privileged countries of the world, in which
both parents and children are sensitized to the conditions of poverty and deprivation
characterizing the children's birth countries"); see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 207
(noting intercountry adoptive families' views on the community value of such adoptions:
"[w]e, like these children whom we claim so adamantly as our kids, have deeper roots
than we knew, an enlarged sense of family, another place in the heart, and a rich and
varied history of facing life issues we would never have encountered without them").
170 Bartholet notes that adoptive parents want to "give back" to organizations in
sending countries and that they "will be more likely to support government policies that
are generous and friendly, rather than stingy and hostile, toward the children's sending
countries, and that they will be more likely to vote for public officials that will support
efforts to alleviate world poverty." Bartholet, supra note 15, at 351.
It seems likely that when people form the kind of powerful loving bonds across
racial and national lines that they form in international adoptive families, it will
affect their feelings in a larger political context about who is 'us' and who is
'other' in ways that will be positive for the world more generally."
Id; see also Bartholet, supra note 8, at 198 (noting that adopters of international
children "have reason to identify, through their children, with the situations of other
children not lucky enough to have found homes," creating "a climate more
sympathetic to wide-ranging forms of support for children abroad.").
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specific adoption debt to sending nations when intercountry
adoptions occur, because those receiving nations will receive the
benefit of the future adult."' Thus, nations themselves could be
"taxed" for the adoptive children they receive, with the proceeds
going to the sending nations, whether that financial obligation is
truly a legally owed hard "tax" or simply a "moral tax," an
expectation that there should be a grant of foreign aid
proportionate to the receiving country's admission of children.
However, recognizing that the basis of Smolin's argument is
not that sending nations should be enriched by adoptions, but that
birthparents should be helped to keep their children, general
foreign aid is a poor method for achieving that goal. In theory, at
least, the international community could utilize the proposed
Intercountry Adoption Agency to devise these international
"taxation" standards to transfer wealth from receiving nations to
sending nations.172 This Intercountry Adoption Agency, in turn,
could distribute these collected "taxes" directly to local
governments, to the parents who need help providing for their
children,' 73 or to the institutions that serve them.'74 Of course,
Carlson has pointed out that there are difficulties with direct
incentives to poor parents, as well as management difficulties in
distributing funds from "taxes" paid by adoptive parents or their
governments to parents believed likely to give up a child because
See Robert 0. Keohane, Reciprocity in InternationalRelations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1,
4-6, 20-21 (1986) (discussing the creation and recognition of duties and obligations in
reciprocity situations between nations, which, in this case, should exist between nations
giving up their future assets, their children, and the receiving nations who recognize their
own obligation to account for that transfer); but see Bartholet, supra note 8, at 207-08
(arguing that while sending nations claim that their adoptable children are "precious
resources," receiving nations such as the United States do not consider them assets).
172 See King, supra note 97, at 465 (describing support systems used in San
Francisco and Michigan that could be models for distributing resources in more effective
ways to birth families wishing to keep their children).
173 In nations with more sophisticated economic systems, this might come in the
form of a bank account or debit card that parents could use to purchase necessities.
Where such systems do not exist, the international adoption financial agency would need
to locate a local charitable organization or government entity to receive and distribute
appropriate economic resources for these families. See, e.g., James P. Ziliak, Craig
Gunderson & David N. Figlio, Food Stamp Caseloads Over the Business Cycle, 69 S.
ECON. J., 903, 903 (2003) (noting that welfare reform in 1996 in the United States
required "states to replace paper coupons with Electronic Benefit Transfer cards").
174 See King, supra note 97, at 464.
171
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of economic desperation.'15
While this thought experiment admittedly may not be realistic
for many reasons, including significant bureaucratic costs,
political obstacles, and possibilities for corruption, it does have
two virtues.
First, an international adoption program that
addresses the financial and societal contributions of these
adoptions would make an important symbolic statement that
furthers adoptable children's right to dignity; rather than treating
adoptable children as liabilities that need to be offloaded or
eliminated, it would engender a recognition that children are
indeed assets of their birth countries, in both developed and
developing nations.17 6
While there is some remnant of
"monetization" in such a scheme, this is a much more important,
and less objectionable, public statement than implying that
children are assets, if at all, only to parents and, therefore, it is the
parents who should pay not only for their care, but also for their
"acquisition."' 7 7 Second, it would recognize that the foreign aid
sent by rich nations to poor ones for child welfare programs is not
bestowed out of charity but due as a right.'
Finally, it would
shed light on the importance of targeting these funds in such a way
as to make the rights described in the Convention on the Rights of
the Child a reality rather than a luxury that nations "buy" only if
175 Carlson focuses particularly on the difficult decision about who would get
money. Carlson, supra note 33, at 748-50. For example, some families would threaten
to give their children up for adoption in order to gain subsidies. Id. One optiondistribution of resources to families with inadequate resources to care for their children
across the board-would remove the incentive to threaten to give one's child up, but
would be cost prohibitive. Id. at 750. On the other hand, a targeted subsidy to prevent
removal of a child in a family that has already taken steps in that direction would be
more feasible and would create a lesser evil (inequality among poor families) than the
evils that might occur if the family chose to let its child die, if the lives of all of a
community's children were threatened by distributing inadequate food and resources to
them all, or if a child was sold on the black market for child labor or prostitution. See id
at 759-60 (discussing these dilemmas of distribution in greater detail).
176 See Bartholet, supra note 8, at 165, 184, 198 (noting the views of some in
sending countries that foreign adoption of their children is the "ultimate exploitation"
and that "[p]olitical forces in the 'sending countries' have been condemning in
increasingly loud voices the practice of giving their countries' children to the imperialist
North Americans and other foreigners.").
177 See Carlson, supra note 33, at 759.
178 See Keohane, supra note 171, at 4, 20-21 (discussing the idea of obligations and
duties being inherent traits of reciprocity when there is an exchange between nations).
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their other basic needs, like security and infrastructure, are met.
2. The Non-DiscriminationPrinciple

As suggested previously, one meaning of dignity is the right of
individuals to be judged as of equal worth. One instantiation of
that principle is in the right to non-discrimination found in many
international covenants.17 9 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognizes rights of nondiscrimination in state treatment of both adults and children.so
Article 2 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR assigns the duty to signatories
to ensure that individuals can exercise their rights without
"discrimination

of

any

kind

as

to . . . national

or

social

origin ... or other status."'"' Article 24 recognizes the right of
every child, without any discrimination, to receive from his
family, society, and the State the protection required by his status
as a minor. 8 2 General Comment 17 links the right to nondiscrimination and national duties to take measures necessary to
achieve this right, including aspects that "may also be economic,
social and cultural."' 83 It notes the responsibility of signatory
nations to take "every possible economic and social measure" to
protect children against the ravages of disease, malnutrition,
violence, inhuman treatment, and exploitation, to "foster the
development of their personality," and provide them with

education.18 4
The Convention on the Rights of the Child similarly provides:
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or
his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or

179 See, e.g., United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 37, art. 2(1).
180 See id art. 24.
181 Id. art. 2(2).
182 Id. art. 24.
183 U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 17: Article 24
(Rights of the Child), adopted on its thirty-fifth session,
3, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) (Apr. 7, 1989).
184 Id.
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social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure
that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members. 85
This Convention similarly recognizes that the right extends to
economic and social wellbeing. 186
There is no logical reason why these provisions should not, as
human rights principles, apply to adoption, a situation in which the
equal worth of individual members of the adoption triad is often
disrespected in both procedural and substantive ways, including by
essentializing or stereotyping them. This application of the nondiscrimination principle has already been invoked in international
adoption.'87 For example, gay and lesbian adoptive parents have
made arguments that excluding them categorically violates their
rights under international covenants not to be discriminated
against because of their "other status," i.e., their sexual
orientation.'
In theory, at least, if a country such as Russia closes its
adoption processes to individual would-be parents solely on the
grounds that they hail from a particular country, those individuals
should be able to argue that, under the ICCPR, they were
discriminated against "because of their national, ethnic or social
origin" or status. Conversely, the country may be able to defeat
such a presumption through evidence that the reason for denial
was not based on the adoptive parents' ethnic or national origin.'
For example, if the country closes its adoption processes to all
foreign adoptive parents, it may be able to argue that it currently
has the resources to ensure a family to all children within its
borders, or that it has closed adoptions in order to make progress
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 2.
Id. art. 3(2)-(3) (requiring State Parties to "ensure the child such protection and
care as is necessary for his or her well-being" and specifying individual duties of
protection of economic and social wellbeing in articles that follow).
187 Jennifer B. Mertus, Barriers, Hurdles, and Discrimination: The Current Status
of LGBT IntercountryAdoption and Why Changes Must Be Made to Effectuate the Best
Interests of the Child,39 CAP. U. L. REv. 271, 311 (2011).
188 Id.
189 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 2(1).
185
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toward that goal.' 90 Such a decision, supported by evidence that
the country indeed has adequate placements for virtually all of its
children, or is taking reasonable measures to reach that goal,
should be able to defeat a discrimination claim made by adoptive
parents."' Similarly, if a nation closes its adoptions to only one
country based on evidence that the country is not providing
adequate protection to the sending nation's adopted children, the
presumption that the decision was the result of discrimination on
the basis of ethnic or social origin would be rebutted.
However, there is a jurisdictional problem with these
arguments. The ICCPR and Convention on the Rights of the
Child primarily focus on internal discrimination, generally treating
decisions by nations against nationals of other countries as
sovereignty decisions rather than discrimination problems. For
example, ICCPR Article 2 rights against non-discrimination apply
"to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction."l9 2 However, in a few cases, foreign nationals
temporarily residing in signatory nations may attempt to adopt
children from their host nation, and these potential adoptive
parents might be able to make a discrimination argument if their
efforts are met with resistance.'9 3 For example, a U.S. diplomat or
CEO of a multinational company stationed in Romania might
attempt to adopt a Romanian child and return with him to the
United States. Should Romanian officials deny his adoption, his
discrimination complaint filed may be met with the rejoinder that
he is being denied adoption due to his status as an alien, not based
on his national origin.'94 Even if the diplomat could succeed in his
190 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra note 183 (encouraging the reporting
by States of the measures being taken to care for children "deprived of their family
environment ... in conditions that most closely resemble those characterizing the family
environment").
'9'
Id.
192 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art.
2(1).
'93

Id.

194 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically addresses
the rights of aliens to "liberty of movement," to "leave the country," and to not be
expelled from the foreign country without reason. Id. arts. 12, 13, 26. While other
articles refer to rights using generally inclusive language and Article 26 protects "all
persons" against discrimination under the law, classification as an alien with regard to
such things as adoption rights and the ability to leave the country with a child adopted of
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claim, this type of scenario would be relatively uncommon. Most
Westerners adopting internationally do not travel to their child's
home nation until their adoptions are well underway, if at all. 19 5 If
a country closes adoptions to those nationals, those individuals
seeking to adopt would have no reason to travel to the country, be
"within the territory," or "subject to [the sending country's]

jurisdiction."

96

However, when we look at who is the intended rights holder,
particularly in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but also
under Article 24 of the ICCPR, in light of the recognition of global
interdependence, the legal right to nondiscrimination based on
national or ethnic status should be seen as inhering in the
adoptable child. It may seem like an awkward use of treaty
language to suggest that a country denying its citizens the right to
be adopted by citizens of a particular nation for ethnocentric or
nationalist reasons is engaging in ethnic or "national or social
origin" discrimination.'
Yet, but for the fact that the child and
the adoptive parents are of different national origins, the child
would be able to be adopted and secure the family that is his right
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the
Hague Convention.
We might consider two examples to explain why country
closures to some foreign nationals constitute discrimination based
on national or social origin. In the first example, two adoptable
children in similar situations in a Russian orphanage are eligible
for adoption by two similarly situated parents, but one parent is
American and the other is Russian, and Russia denies adoption to
the first child.' 98 The child is being discriminated against based on
the national origin of the adoptive parent.'9 9 In the second
example, two adoptable children in similar situations in American
and Russian orphanages are eligible for adoption by two similarly

that country is not specifically laid out. Id.
195 See, e.g., McKinney, supra note 29, at 361 (offering an account of the
Vanderhoef's adoption of Julian from Guatemala).
196 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art. 2(1).
197 Id. art. 24(1).

Id.
199 Id
98
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situated American parents and the second is not adopted. 20 0 Here,
the child who is not adopted is being discriminated against on the
basis of his own national origin.
To illustrate why a difference in the nationality of an adoptive
parent and adoptable child might give rise to a discrimination
claim akin to national origin or ethnicity claims, we might
appropriate an analogy from American constitutional law. In
Loving v. Virginia,20 1 the Supreme Court faced the argument that
a Virginia law against the intermarriage of white and non-white
citizens did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it
forbade whites and non-whites equally to marry across the color
line.20 2 In finding that the law violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court essentially held that denying the right to enter
into a fundamental relationship because of the difference in the
parties' races was racial discrimination.20 3 So too, denying a child
the right to a family through adoption solely or primarily because
of the different national or ethnic origin of his intended parents
"without an objective and reasonable justification" 204 should
violate the ICCPR and CRC non-discrimination provisions.20 5
On the other hand, a nation might argue that the correct basis
for distinction is not the national origin or ethnicity of the parent,
but his nationality, otherwise viewed as his status as an alien with
respect to the country of the child's origin. However, analogous
international cases on separation of families bear out the fact that,
for human rights purposes, nationality can be a status giving rise to
a claim for discrimination.20 6 For example, in the recent case of
Hode and Abdi v. United Kingdom,207 the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), Fourth Section, found that the United
200

Id.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967).
202 Id. at 7-8.
203 Id. at 12.
204 D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 270, available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83256 (noting that ethnic
origin discrimination is a form of racial discrimination).
205 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, art.
2(1); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 2.
206 Hode and Abdi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22341/09, HUDOC (2012),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114244.
207 Id.
201
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Kingdom had violated the non-discrimination provision of Article
14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 208 by refusing permission for a
spouse to join her refugee husband in the United Kingdom,
because she had not married him before he left the country on a
visit.209 When moving to the second step of the analysis, whether
there is "no objective and reasonable justification if it does not
pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realized," the European Court of Human Rights
focused on an "internal" difference in British law.2 10 It found that
there was not an "objective and reasonable" difference between
refugee families who were not entitled to be reunited and worker
and student spouses who were allowed to be reunited under British
law. 2 11 However, in the first step of the analysis, when the court
was considering whether the complainants were treated differently
on the basis of a status recognized by international law, the Court
held that immigration status or nationality was a "status" on par
with ethnic or national origin and could be the subject of a
complaint.2 12 Moreover, the ECHR has recognized nationality as a
status giving rise to discrimination claims in other cases. 213 When
a country denies an adoption of its own child whose best interests
mandate adoption "because a parent is American," traditional
sovereignty concerns with immigration, such as national security
or economic competitiveness, do not come into play.2 14 Instead,
such a ban more resembles the unthinking racist or ethnic origin
discrimination that stereotypes one individual as representative of

208 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
9, June 1, 2010, E.U., available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
005.htm.
209 Hode and Abdi v. United Kingdom, supra note 206.
210 Id. at 15-16.
211 Id. at 13.
212

Id. at 12-14.

213

See, e.g., WOUTER VANDENHOLE, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY IN THE

VIEW OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 128 (2005) (describing court case on

"other status" protection).
214 See, e.g., Herszenhom & Eckholm, supra note 3 (discussing political
motivation for Russian ban on adoptions by U.S. citizens).
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Such

stereotyping essentially violates the dignitary rights of both child

and parent by refusing to recognize them as they actually are.
In summary, where intercountry adoption is in the best
interests of the child under the CRC and the Hague Convention, it
is incumbent upon international courts and authorities to recognize
the right of a child not to have his adoption disrupted by his
sending country's arbitrary refusal to grant adoption rights to his
adoptive parents based on their nationality alone. Some further
national interest must be proven in order to block such an
adoption.
3. Responding to Concerns about Loss of a Child's
Culture
One of the chief arguments against intercountry adoption is
that such adopted children will be robbed of the only world that
they know, including their culture, and thus robbed of their
identity.2 16 The Convention on the Rights of the Child also
suggests that the principle of human dignity carries an implicit
promise to respect the origins of each displaced child as they have
shaped his or her identity.2 17 As history has demonstrated, this
global principle carries the seeds of potential harm as well as
possibility. Advocates can legitimately provide horror stories of
older children so ripped from their culture that they suffer
profound emotional and tragic blows to their identity.218 At a
political level, the Convention on the Rights of the Child rebukes
individuals or their states and countries of origin for adopting an
attitude and presumption of cultural superiority, assuming that
children from other countries live in inferior cultures or are
themselves inferior by virtue of their cultures, and that adopting
215 See Perry, supra note 12, at 51-53 (discussing attitudes towards multi-racial
families).
216 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 33, at 746 (describing view that even young
children can be robbed of their cultural identity).
217 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 168 (requiring that
state parties "respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference").
218 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 99, at 37-45 (describing trauma suffered by two
children adopted from Southeast Asia).
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and assimilating them into American homes will raise their
"worth" and provide them with a better life than their culture of
origin could possibly provide.2 19
Even if one refuses to accept the conclusion that cultural critics
draw, it is important to acknowledge the truth of the criticism.
The requirement that adoptive children's cultures be respected by
their new families is not simply a moral requirement, it is also a
practical necessity, at least with older children.22 0 The U.S.
experience with boarding schools and adoption of American
Indian children into white majority homes not prepared to address
their cultural differences illustrates the practical consequences of
raising children who have lived in other cultures with an attitude
that the new culture is superior to the old.2 2' Many Indian children
ripped from their cultures or confronted with the claim that their
cultures of origin were inferior and that they should leave them
behind experienced severe mental and emotional trauma that
followed them into adulthood.22 2
Even where such a message is not explicit, American Indian
and other cross-culturally adopted children report the difficulty of
dealing not only with differences from their adoptive family that
stem from their own personalities, but also with cultural
differences that they may not even be consciously aware of, often
attributing that difference to some personal fault or weakness.22 3
The effect of this trauma is well documented in the higher rates of
alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide in the Indian community, all
of which have had consequences both for succeeding generations
of American Indians and for society as a whole.2 24

219

See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17.
Id.
221 See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, Reparations,Self-Determination and the Seventh
Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 47, 58-59 (2008) (noting that American Indian
children "were raised in an environment that often frowned upon their indigenousness"
and as a result they "experienced long-term emotional, social, and psychological
problems").
222 Id
223 Id. at 59 (observing that cross-culturally adopted American Indian children
"found it difficult both in childhood and adulthood to establish permanent roots ... and
sought to deny their own heritage. This denial and lack of community connection caused
further distress, often leading to such things as substance abuse.").
224 Id. at 58-59. Making an observation about the suicide rates among adopted
220
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As scholars have recognized, however, the nature of the
deprivation that children will suffer depends upon many things.
One is the age of a child-it is difficult to argue that an infant has
been robbed of a culture he has never experienced, whereas an
adolescent certainly will suffer a substantial loss if she is removed
to a remote and different cultural setting.225 Second, some children
are more resilient than others.22 6 Some have had loving and stable
care for years, which they have lost through tragedies such as
parental AIDS deaths or war or famine, and others have never felt
the security of a family and home.22 7 As we see in First World
cultures as well, some children seem to be "wired" to be
emotionally fragile and even less profound dislocations can cause
profound damage, while other children seem to surmount even
large tragedies such as the loss of parents, homes, and even
national culture because of man-made and natural disasters.22 8
That is not to say that older children cannot gain from being
placed into adoptive homes different from their culture of origin,
only that it is a much more sensitive business. To protect children,
adoption professionals and regulators must be committed to
biculturalism, to the notion that children placed for adoption are
not simply leaving their culture of origin for a new one, but that
American Indians:
[S]uicide rate [was] twice that of the reservation population and four times that
of the general population .... Since many of the economic, cultural, and social
structures of American Indian communities were built around these kinship
networks, the destruction of the family unit contributed to the dire
socioeconomic conditions befalling many Native American nations.
Id.
225 See, e.g., Rena A. Krakow, Shannon Tao & Jenny Roberts, Adoption Age Effects
on English Language Acquisition: Infants and Toddlers from China, 26 SEMINARS
SPEECH & LANGUAGE 33, 42 (2005).
226 See, e.g., Ann S. Masten, Ordinary Magic: Resilience Processes in
Development, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 227, 233 (2001) ("Studies of Romanian adoptees
provide dramatic documentation of developmental catch-up in many of the children, both
physically and cognitively . ... However, the impressive recovery trajectories of many
children following dramatic improvements in rearing conditions do not mean that all
children recover well.").
227 See, e.g., Spencer Eth & Robert S. Pynoos, Developmental Perspectives on
Psychic Trauma in Childhood, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 48-50 (Charles R. Figley ed.,
1985) (discussing the many variables that can influence a child's ability to cope with
trauma at varying stages of development).
228 See, e.g., id.
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they are gaining a second culture, sometimes a second language,
and possibly even a second religion, that will make them stronger
and more versatile citizens. 2 29 This phenomenon already occurs in
American families where spouses marry across racial, religious,
ethnic, class, or educational lines and spouses essentially bring up
their children in both of the cultures from which they come. 23 0
Where adult spouses are from different cultural situations, there
can be conscious recognition of cultural differences and mature
negotiation and planning about those differences will be carried on
as traditions taught to the family's children. 23 1 However, in the
case of adoption, where parents share a common history and
culture that is different from their child's, the adoptive child is in
no position to recognize his or her difference as valuable and to
negotiate how he or she will become "bicultural" with the
parents.232 If the parents are not genuinely respectful of the
different culture and eager for their whole family to become
bicultural, the explicit and implicit message of respect for diversity
is unlikely to be heard by the adoptive child or other children in
the family.
Finally, intercountry adoption is not the cultural death sentence
for children that it once might arguably have been when
Americans were adopting children from Korea or Japan.
Recognizing the fact of modem global interdependence, proadoption scholars have noted that the dislocation suffered by
children being adopted internationally or transracially in previous
generations may not be as profound in current adoptions as in the
233
past.23
For one thing, worldwide immigration has brought
increasing cultural diversity to First, Second, and Third world
cultures so that children who grow up, at least in urban settings,
229 See, e.g., Angela Ka-yee Leung, William W. Maddux, Adam D. Galinsky &
Chi-yue Chiu, MulticulturalExperience Enhances Creativity: The When and How, 63
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 169,

172 (2008) ("Whereas

culture may constrain creativity,

multicultural experience may foster the creative expansion of ideas.").
230 See, e.g., id
231 See, e.g., id.

232 See, e.g., David M. Brodzinsky, Adjustment to Adoption: A Psychosocial
Perspective, 7 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 25, 26-27 (discussing rates of emotional and

psychological disorders among adoptees).
233 See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 8, at 202-07 (describing success of children
adopted internationally).
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are likely to be exposed to more than one culture.2 34 Parents who
adopt across cultures are increasingly probed for evidence that
they respect their child's cultural difference and will make
affirmative efforts to let their child experience aspects of those
cultures, even in their own nations.235 Increasingly, adoptive
parents are taking their children to see their homelands and in
some cases, their birth families.2 36
Moreover, adopted adults have much more opportunity to
engage in their cultures of origin, to travel through educational
opportunities in high school and college, and even to work
transnationally.
Informal engagement through internet chat
rooms, email "pen pals," and other ways in which people now
virtually "reach their hands" across the world can similarly bring
children into contact with their cultures of origin.237 Adopted
adults are contacting families of origin through internet searches
and other electronic means as well.23 8 The "paper trail" for
adoption is improving throughout the world, albeit more slowly in
some places than others, and the advent of open adoption has
made birth records more accessible, albeit, again more slowly in
some places than others.2 39 If internationally adopted children
234

See, e.g., Nancy Foner, How Exceptional is New York? Migration and

Multiculturalism in the Empire City, 30 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 999, 1015 (2007) ("As

the children of immigrants come of age, new cultural patterns, often referred to as
cultural hybrids, are emerging as they grow up, go to school, work beside, and
sometimes intermarry with the long-established native-born.").
235 See Patricia Hanigan Scroggs & Heather Heitfield, InternationalAdopters and
Their Children: Birth Culture Ties, GENDER ISSUES, Fall 2001, 3, at 9 ("The respondents
as a whole had very positive attitudes toward developing and maintaining connections to,
and an appreciation and respect for, the cultures of the countries from which their
children were adopted.").
236 See, e.g., id. at 15 (discussing motivations for taking adopted children to visit
their home country).
237 See id. (discussing various ways of developing an adopted child's connection
with the home culture).
238 See Smolin, supra note 99, at 9-10 (describing laws addressing open adoption,
research findings, and considerations of the best interests of the child) (citing CHILD
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, WORKING WITH BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMILIES TO

SUPPORT OPEN ADOPTION 1-6 (2003)); Wilkening, supra note 4, at 1049-50, 1054-55

(discussing Hague Convention requirement for pre-adoption records and paucity of such
records in some countries).
239 See Smolin, supra note 99, at 9-10; Wilkening, supra note 4, at 1049-50, 105455.
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experience anxiety about their birth families or their national or
cultural heritage, they have many more opportunities to explore
their past and engage with their birth culture than past generations
of adopted children have had.240 People do not stop learning and
changing once they become adults.
Thus, even if there is validity to the concern that
transnationally adopted children may lose their culture,
transnational adoption need not be a cultural "death sentence"
even in situations where children grow up in relatively
homogeneous Western communities.
While a child who is not immersed in his culture will not gain
precisely the same experience as one who grows up inside of that
culture, from a social perspective, we should be happy to welcome
children into the world who are bicultural, just as we celebrate the
richness that comes with children who are bilingual or have had
the opportunity to travel or live in other cultures. These children
can help us translate from culture to culture and often see the
cultural complexity of the world through new and imaginative
lenses that those who have lived in monolithic cultures can never
quite experience.24 ' They can better identify the similarities that
bring cultures together and the things that distinguish them in
order to identify those things that divide us and cause unfortunate
international misunderstandings.24 2 They and those who have had
similar cross-cultural experiences-to be found, for example, in
organizations of adopted Korean-Americans-can create new
cultures and communities that contribute to the valuable diversity
of our world.24 3 Just as we have learned from intercultural and
interreligious marriage and friendship, we can learn from these
families whose members bring different cultures to the mosaic.244
240

See Smolin, supra note 99, at 9-10; Wilkening, supra note 4, at 1049-50, 1054-

55.
See Scroggs & Heitfield, supra note 235, at 24 (discussing adopted children
interacting with people from their home culture).
242 Id
243 Eleana Kim, Wedding Citizenship and Culture: Korean Adoptees and the
Global Family ofKorea, 74 SOCIAL TEXT 57, 58 (2003) ("Transnational Korean adoptees
have recently been legally incorporated into the 'global family' of South Korea as part of
the cultural and economic 'globalization' policy (segyehwa) nominally inaugurated
under former president Kim Young Sam and expanded under president Kim Dae Jung.").
244 See Foner, supra note 234, at 1015.
241
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That is not to be idealistic about these blended families--certainly,
cultural and identity differences can cause conflict as often as new
insights. 2 45 Nevertheless, that paradoxical intimacy of conflict and
embrace engenders what makes it possible for the human
community to develop and thrive.
4. The Family Diversity Principleand the Rights of
Recognition and Equal Worth
Any new international rights regime for adoption must not
only recognize the historical diversity of the family but also hold
diversity to be a value and a resource in a dignitary understanding
of intercountry adoption law. Practically speaking, as family
historians have pointed out, families have taken diverse shapes not
only over time, but also within particular historical periods.246
Once again, intercountry adoption discourse has weighted family
diversity only on the side of discouraging adoption, not on the side
of facilitating it.247 It is not only adoption skeptics who have
argued that intercountry adoption practice has ignored the diverse
and equally valuable family formations in non-Western countries
that provide "a family" to a child without parental care, thus
obviating the need to find a new nuclear family for the child.248
United Nations commentaries on the international conventions

245 See Brodzinsky, supra note 232, at 27.
246 See generally Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, Family and Household: The Analysis
ofDomestic Groups, 8 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOL. 161, 166 (1979) (discussing variations in
domestic organizations).
247 See, e.g., Rachel Levy-Shiff, Naomi Zoran & Shmuel Shulman, International
and Domestic Adoption: Child,Parentsand Family Adjustment, 20 INT'L J.BEHAV. DEV.
109, 110 (1997).
From a theoretical point of view, we can expect several factors to jeopardise the
adjustment of international adoptees. (1) Children placed in families with
different racial, cultural, and religious characteristics from their own may be
less easily integrated into their adoptive family and community. They may lose
access to their own heritage and be exposed to some measure of racism.
Consequently, they may have difficulties, especially in forming a positive selfconcept and integrated identity.
Id.
248 See, e.g., King, supra note 97, at 468 (decrying failure to recognize care of
children "in social networks that do not reflect a modern nuclear family," noting "that
the concept of a modem nuclear family may or may not have any relevance to these
children and their families").
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themselves underscore the importance of recognizing non-nuclear
family formations and alternative community arrangements for
caring for children without birthparent care in identifying an incountry placement for a child.249
However, the rush to accuse adoption advocates of Western
imperialism or family myopia may be sometimes misplaced. NonWestern cultures' extended families are undergoing what some
would call erosion,250 countering the Western tendency to
romanticize them. 25 1 As a consequence of urbanization and
capitalism in non-Western cultures, more families in these cultures
are nuclear or single-parent families, separated by long distances
and economics and overburdened by difficult work situations.2 52
In these circumstances, the subsidiarity principle may not as easily
support local placement of the world's children.
From the other side, the Western paradigm of the nuclear
husband-wife family is eroding, even though non-Western
adoption systems have traditionally embraced it as normative for
appropriate intercountry adoptions and excluded, or given lower
priority to, non-nuclear heterosexual families. While other willing
parents, including single and disabled parents, older parents, gay
and lesbian couples, and even unmarried heterosexual couples are
more successfully adopting children in the United States, some
sending countries have placed significant obstacles in the way of
these parents attempting to adopt their children. 2 53 As noted, gay
and lesbian couples have challenged their exclusion from
intercountry adoption by sending countries as a discriminatory

249

See David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The

Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 403, 408 (2005)

("For children who cannot be raised by their own families, an appropriate alternative
family environment should be sought in preference to institutional care, which should be
used only as a last resort and as a temporary measure . . . .").
250 See, e.g., T.W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 181-84 (2004)
(describing nuclearizing effects on extended South African family as a result of factors
such as colonialism, urbanization, and wage labor migration).
251 Id
Id
See, e.g., Mertus, supra note 187, at 284-95 (2011) (describing other nationstates limitations on single and GLBT adoptive parents, and other limitations on age,
wealth, and health).
252
253
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practice.254 If private intermediaries and national governments are
not open to forms of family life that diverge from either their
conventional family form or one that they idealize, they will be
unable to recruit families for as many children as possible.
Following the previous discussion, the dignitary principle
found in the U.N. documents suggests that nations can violate the
principles of recognition and equal worth by failing to take diverse
family forms on their own merits, by stereotyping them according
to expectations of any one culture about "the" best way to raise a
child.2 SS Inspecting the ability of a particular adoptive family to
care for a particular adoptable child does not violate these
principles because it investigates the strengths and weaknesses of
the family as it is in reality against the abilities and needs of the
child as he or she is. 256 This happens, or should happen, in most
adoptions anyway through mechanisms such as the homestudy.257
Imposing some categorical ban on certain families before this
inspection occurs fails to recognize the equal worth each family
form deserves unless and until it is proven that such a family is not
capable of parenting a child.258 Once again, the nondiscrimination

254 See, e.g., Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State
Court Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1497, 1501-03 (1998) (describing state court
challenges to adoption statutes discriminating against gay and lesbian adoptive parents).
255 See Smolin, supra note 249, at 408.
256

See id

257 Vicky Ku, Intercountry Adoptions: Instituting Educational Programs in the
Adoption Process to FacilitateAwareness of Cultural Identity Issues, 43 FAM. CT. REV.
511, 514 (2005).
A home study is a series of meetings between the adoptive parents and a social
worker that is designed to provide the parents with detailed information about
the adoption and to give the social worker the opportunity to assess the parents'
understanding of the difficulties involved and to determine if they have thought
through the consequences of adoption.
Id.
258 Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practicesin 2000: Serving Whose
Interests?, 19 FAM. L. Q. 677, 685 (2000).
Since January 1, 1997, no state or other entity in a state receiving federal funds
and involved in adoption or foster care may (1) deny any person the opportunity
to become an adoptive or a foster parent, or (2) delay or deny the placement of a
child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child involved.
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principles of the CRC and the ICCRP suggest that the form a
family takes is a "status" that should give rise to further inquiry
about whether there is something about the behavior of that family
formation that violates the sending or receiving state's public
policy. 259 While a state party may factor in the difficulty of childadoptive family cultural differences, including linguistic, religious
or political differences, as a basis for granting or denying a
placement, state parties should not be able to deny an otherwise
qualified family adoption based solely on, for example, interracial,
gender or similar differences between the child and the family.
C. The Recognition of Vulnerability
The "vulnerability and the human condition" movement
originated by Professor Martha Fineman focuses on grounding
public policy on the reality that "fundamental to our shared
humanity is our shared vulnerability, which is universal and
constant-inherent in the human condition." 260 The vulnerability
movement calls upon societal institutions to be shaped by "the
recognition of, and need to respond to, this shared
vulnerability."26 1
Adoption is a paradigmatic situation illustrating this reality
about the human condition. Citing psychologists Mary Stewart van
Leeuwen and Gretchen Miller Wrobel, theologian Kristen
Johnston Largen expands upon how each member of the adoption
triad brings his or her vulnerabilities and sense of brokenness to
the process of adoption:
"Adoption is valuable for forming families, yet it encompasses
loss. Members of the adoption triad-adoptive parents, adopted
children, and birth parents-are influenced by the loss inherent
in adoption." For example, there are mothers who are forced
into giving up their children for adoption both because of social
pressures . . . and because of economic pressures .

. .

. Also,

there is the pain involved for potential parents who are thwarted

259 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 169 (establishing
acceptable parameters for international adoption).
260 Vulnerability and the Human Condition, An InterdisciplinaryInitiative, EMORY
UNIVERSITY, http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/about/index.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2013).
261 Id
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in their attempts to adopt[,] .. [whose experience StevensonMoessner likens to miscarriage]. And, finally, there are those
adopted children who long for a sense of reconciliation and
wholeness, a more complete sense of identity through a
connection with birth parents; and sometimes this longing
simply goes unfulfilled.262
The vulnerability in adoption can also be found in the regrets

of birth parents that their own actions brought them to such a crisis
or that they felt forced to give up their children.26 3 It may also be
found in the grief of adoptive parents that they have not been able
to bear birth-children, which Kristen Johnson Largen notes has
been exacerbated by the promise of reproduction by technology,
which increases the cost of failure and solidifies the concept of
adoption as a "last resort," with all that may imply about the
worthiness of the child to be adopted.26 4
As applied to adoption, the vulnerability movement would
demand that the adoption community-individuals, institutions
and governments-should confer on adoptive children and their
parents, both birth and adoptive, those assets, including "wealth,
health, education, family relationships, and marketable skills" that
make it possible for the children to grow up as resilient adults.26 5
This principle embraces acknowledging, respecting, and taking
responsibility for the vulnerability of the adoptive child and his or
her parents, both birth and adoptive, and thus should be preferred
over a "best interests of the child" standard.
As in other areas involving the care and raising of children,
such as custody arrangements, the "best interests of the child"
principle has gained virtually universal assent in the adoptive
community.26 6 It finds a prominent place in the preamble to the
Hague Convention, which reads in part that the signatory states are
entering into the Convention "[c]onvinced of the necessity to take
262 Kristen Johnson Largen, I Love to Tell the Story: Reshaping the Narrative of
Adoption, 51 DIALOG 284, 287 (2012).
263 Id
264

Id. at 290.

265 See Fineman, supra note 28, at 13-14 (discussing vulnerability and resilience
generally).
266 See Bartholet, supra note 8, at 198 (noting that nation states generally agree that
the "best interests" standard should be "the paramount principle" guiding out-of-home
placements).
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measures to ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the
best interests of the child and with respect for his or her
fundamental rights."2 67 It is also the signature substantive standard
that colors the Convention on the Rights of the Child.2 68
However, the recognition of human vulnerability extends
beyond a "best interests" standard. To be sure, the "best interests"
standard properly signals that when there is a fundamentally
irreconcilable conflict that portends profound harm to the child,
the child's best interests need to be paramount to those of either
birth or adoptive parents. 2 6 9 Holding that standard in mind helps to
ensure that children will not be used as the means to either their
birth or adoptive parents' personal ends to the extent it is possible
to prevent that in the real world.270 Since adults have more power
and voice to further their own interests, it is important that courts
and governments lift up the interests of the child as the
predominant focal point for decision-making in situations of
conflicting claims and needs.2 7 1 Such a recognition resembles
Catholic theology's "preferential option for the poor" that lifts up
the needs of the poor as a special focus of attention for both justice
and charity, in recognition of the fact that the poor are often
invisible and undervalued.27 2
Yet the "best interests" standard carries false seeds about the
possibility and desirability of a "perfect match." It can be read to
mean that there is a family "out there" that will provide the best
possible environment for the child, and that it is incumbent on
institutions and governments to identify and match the child with
that family. 273 Because no family is "perfect," such a standard

267

See Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl.
268 See Batholet, supra note 8, at 169 (discussing the standards for adoption
generally and prioritizing adoption within the home country).
269 Id.
270 Id
271 Id
272 Russell Powell, Theology in Public Reason and Legal Discourse: A Case for
the PreferentialOption for the Poor, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & Soc. JUST. 327,
332 (2008-09) (describing the principle of the preferential option, described by Gutierrez
as "a moral imperative to create conditions for marginalized voices to be heard, to
defend the defenseless, and to assess lifestyles, policies, and institutions in terms of their
impact on the poor and the excluded").
273 The Hague Convention makes it incumbent on signatory states "as a matter of
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may tempt governments to violate an established priority of all

child welfare programs and international treaties such as the
Hague Convention-protecting a family of origin 274-by
pressuring a birth-family to deliver the child to this "best"

family.2 75 Conversely, the "best interests" standard may be
misread as a call to deny a prospective adoptive family in another
country the opportunity to adopt because of the possibility that
some "perfect" culturally matched parent may arise in the child's
home country at some point in his life.276 Thus, while a
government is waiting for a "perfect family," a child may be
losing developmental and attachment ground by waiting in an
inferior institution.
Even when adoption is the only realistic choice, the moral
weight that the "best interests" standard may impose on
intermediaries, adoptive and birth parents alike, to find an ideal
family that does not exist may put inappropriate pressure on the
adult decision-makers in that process. Birthparents may harbor
guilt if they are involved in the selection of an adoptive family that
does not meet their dreams for their children.2 77 Even if the
adoption is not open, birth parents may blame themselves if they
discover, later in life, that the family to which their children have
been sent is abusive, neglectful, or otherwise problematic.27 8 On

priority, [to take] appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care of his or
her family of origin." See Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. Generally, the
standard's assumption that families of origin are most likely to have the biological and
emotional ties necessary to sacrifice their selfish interests on behalf of their birthchildren seems to have practical warrant. While that assumption proves to be false in
numerous cases, it does have a virtue, as Professor Bartholet suggests, of balancing the
overweening power of the state by protecting fundamental rights to family decisionmaking and family integrity. My argument here follows a similar critique of the "best
interests" standard, see Carlson, supra note 34, at 774-75 (describing the "best interests"
standard as excluding the interests of other members of the adoption triad, and
misleading in its promise of a "best" placement for the child, which may delay
placement).
274 See Hague Convention, supra note 16, at pmbl.
275 See Carlson, supra note 34, at 774-75.
276

See id

277 See, e.g., Reuben Pannor, Annette Baran & Arthur D. Sorosky, Birth Parents
Who Relinquished Babiesfor Adoption Revisited, 17 FAM. PROC. 329 (1978) (discussing
the emotions of birth parents at varying stages following the adoption of their children).
278 Id
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the other side, adoptive families may experience failure when their
adopted child comes with unforeseen disabilities or challenges, or
post-adoption family life is not as idyllic as they built it up to be.
The "best interests" standard also implies that the interests of
all others involved in adoption should be neglected in the quest to
find that perfect match for the child. In particular, the "best
interests" standard can be used to downplay the fundamental rights
of birth parents to raise their children. 27 9 The vulnerabilities
movement asks governmental and social institutions to recognize
that some families of origin are, indeed, extremely vulnerable for
any number of reasons.2 8 Single birth parents may be under
significant stress in raising their children alone, especially if they
carry psychological or other baggage from their own families of
origin. 281' Birth parents may also simply lack role models or
adequate education about effective parenting skills.282 Employing
the "best interests" standard ruthlessly may result in social
workers pressuring natal parents to give their children up for
adoption in circumstances in which merely providing the parents
with appropriate social supports would make it possible for their
children to thrive in their care.283 It may also be used to shame
natal parents because their family situation is not as perfect as a
"best interests" standard would seem to require.
On the other side of the adoption triad, the "best interests"
standard can be used to ignore or damage adoptive parents' right
279 See Smolin, supra note 13, at 283 (discussing competing views of inter-country
adoption).
280 See e.g., Vulnerability and the Human Condition,supra note 260.

Ensuring meaningful equality of opportunity and access requires a responsive
state that actively and comprehensively monitors its asset-conferring institutions
- one that addresses the unequal distribution of privilege that affects citizens
across identity markers. Such an approach may help us transcend the limitations
and political landmines of our current discrimination-based inquiry rooted in
identity categories.
Id
Pannor et al., supra note 277, at 4 (noting that the most frequent reason birth
parents gave for relinquishing their child was that the mother was single and felt the
child would be better in a two-parent home).
282 Id. (noting the second most common reason for relinquishing a child was being
"unprepared for parenthood").
283 Id. (citing pressure from social worker as one of the common reasons birth
parents relinquished the child for adoption).
281
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to dignity, which needs also to be considered. As Professor
Largen suggests, adoptive families engaged in the process are also
vulnerable.28 4 Infertile adoptive parents have suffered social
shaming because of their inability to conceive.28 5 In many eras,
adoptive families have been viewed as less worthy or less
honorable than families with birth children.2 86 The process of
inspection that adoptive parents undergo, particularly since the
professionalization of adoptive services, has resulted in minute
probing of adoptive families to identify a "perfect match" and a
"safe risk" for each child.2 87 Such inspection can be invasive and
debilitating to adoptive families who may feel forced to choose
between disclosing their failings (with the risk of being denied the
opportunity to adopt) or masking possible weaknesses or
vulnerabilities in their situation or parenting skills in order to
ensure a placement.2 88 In addition to the short, and sometimes
terrifying, waiting period after placement during which adoptive
parents are at risk of losing their children to a birth parent who
changes her mind, the American adoptive process usually involves
extensive waiting periods before and after placement.2 89 In the
pre-placement waiting period, adoptive parents can go through a
roller-coaster of emotions as potential adoptive children are being
sought and matched, with emotionally devastating parallels to an
auction.290 In the post-placement period, parents are monitored for

284 See Largen, supra note 262, at 290.
285 See id at 290 (considering the damage to "an individual and a couple's sense of
self' when a child cannot be conceived).
286 Id. at 289-90.
287 See Christine Adamec & William L. Pierce, THE ENCYLCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION

133-35 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the typical pre-adoption inspection, which includes a
process of evaluation and instruction by an agency representative and will likely include
discussions about intimate information, a home study, individual conferences, classes,
and a background investigation).
288 See id. at 135 (discussing pre-adoption interviews in which potential adoptive
parents are probed about failed attempts to conceive, and the fact that adoption can be
denied if the case worker feels that the couple or individual provides misleading
information or has not adequately come to terms with their infertility).
289 See, e.g., Steps in the Domestic Infant Adoption Process, ADOPTIONS TOGETHER,

http://www.adoptionstogether.org/Adopting/Adoptanlnfant/DomesticAdoptionProcess.as
px (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (providing one adoption agency's description of its
extensive waiting periods).
290 See Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 135 (describing the adoption waiting
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signs that they are not being successful with their adoptive
children and can worry that they must be on their "best behavior"
to ensure that they will be allowed to adopt their children.29 '
Heavy-handed caseworkers may potentially coerce or shame
adoptive parents into making parenting decisions that they would
not otherwise freely choose to make.
The recognition of human vulnerability requires that states and
institutions pay equal attention to the vulnerabilities and needs of
everyone in the adoption triad and respect and respond to those
needs as the adoptive process proceeds. As with the Hague
Convention, it recognizes the priority of keeping families of origin
together, when that is possible without significant damage to the
child, honoring both the rights of the birth parent to raise her child
whenever possible and the child's interest in being raised in her
community of origin.29
Yet, it also recognizes that adoptive
families, including those who are willing to make risky
commitments to children with significant challenges, deserve
respect for their own identities and gifts.293
Finally, the
recognition of human vulnerability suggests the importance of
individualized consideration of the needs for support of birth
parents, children, and adoptive parents; in the making of families,
one size does not fit all.294 This is true about homestudy and other
investigative requirements, as well as the imposition of financial,
educational, or other minimum qualifications on adopting families.
Furthermore, it is a challenge to the rush toward standardization of
adoption processes that the international adoption conventions are
furthering.
The recognition of vulnerability calls for less judgmental
intrusion on these adoptive families, asking agencies that do home
studies and investigations of adoptive parents to think carefully
about the "least restrictive alternatives" in data-gathering, to

period as a time of "fluctuating anxiety levels").
291 See, e.g., Steps in the Domestic Infant Adoption Process,supra note 289.
292 See Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(b).
293 Adherence to Professor Martha Albertson Fineman's call to recognize and
respond to every person's vulnerability would inevitably lead to recognition thatthose
willing to adopt are deserving. See Vulnerability and the Human Condition, An
InterdisciplinaryInitiative,supra note 260.
294 See King, supra note 97, at 466-67.
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ensure that they are asking for information that is truly relevant to
the quality of placement, and to implement policies and
procedures which treat adoptive parents with dignity and respect
for the unique anxieties and stresses attending the process of
adoption.
As no family can be fully prepared for the demands a child
will place on it, and in adoption, these surprises will be of an even
larger order of magnitude in many cases, the recognition of
vulnerability also demands the support of agencies designed to
help adoptive parents carry out their parental responsibilities in the
ways that they have determined would best suit their family values
and goals. Along with adoption tax breaks, federal and state
subsidies for special needs adoption go part of the way toward that
goal.29 5 However, as earlier suggested, many such programs
define "special needs" children very narrowly to include children
with severe disabilities, excluding older or minority children who
also may present special challenges to families who adopt such
children but have no personal experience of what it is like to be a
minority or to be bounced around from home to home.296 Many, if
not most, of these programs and tax breaks provided for adoption
are standardized or, for disabled children, are confined to a dollar
range rather than being calibrated to account for adopting parents'
varying economic circumstances or medical and other costs
required to maximize the potential of disabled children.2 97 In fact,
one author has noted that the current tax break system is actually
backwards, because it gives parents with substantial means (e.g.,
$100,000 in taxable income) more of a benefit than those adoptive
295 Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 81 ("[A special needs adoption] study
revealed that parents found adoption subsidy and Medicaid to be very important and said
that they could not have afforded to adopt without these supports in place.").
296 See, e.g., Adoption Credit and Adoption Assistance Programs, IRS TAX Topic
607, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc607.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013)
[M]any U.S. children who have disabilities are not considered special needs for
the purposes of the adoption credit. Generally, special needs adoptions are the
adoptions of children whom the state's child welfare agency considers difficult
to place for adoption, and most foster care adoptions are special needs
adoptions, but few other adoptions are special needs adoptions.
Id.
297 See, e.g., Adoption Subsidy in the United States, NORTH AM. COUNCIL ON
ADOPTABLE CHILDREN, http://www.nacac.org/adoptionsubsidy/us.html

(last visited Oct.

27, 2013) (noting that adoption subsidies play a critical role in encouraging adoptions).
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parents with smaller incomes, who may not be able to take
advantage of the tax breaks at all.298
Finally, the recognition of human vulnerability reinforces the
need for the global adoption community to have an honest
conversation about how the needs of the world's children can best
be met. To focus on the vulnerabilities rather than the rights of
those in the adoption triad avoids the necessary consequence that
some must win and others lose because rights trump other
interests.299 That requires compassionate accounting for these
vulnerabilities rather than treating the Hague Convention's
legitimate concern that children be able to grow up in an
environment of "happiness, love and understanding" as an
impossible dream that justifies nations in not doing what they can
to aid displaced children.
Moreover, honest conversation about the vulnerability of
members of the adoption triad can lead to honest and supportive
conversation about the resources (or lack of resources) and
vulnerabilities of the communities and nations whose children of
origin are at stake. In recent decades, many countries have pushed
back against intercountry adoptions.30 0
In some cases, this
governmental response has been for very good reasons.30 ' There
have been many shady practices, such as baby selling and coercion
of birth parents to relinquish children from their homes in the
Third World to demanding parents in the First World.302
Moreover, the vulnerability of families in the Third World has
made it tempting for parents and governments there to relinquish
their responsibilities while, at the same time, First World adoptive
parents have adopted the mentality that adopted children are much
better off in their care.303 As a result, it has been easy for First
World governments, institutions, and parents to refuse to
298

Nathaniel S. Hibben, Comment, The Inequitable Tax Benefits ofAdoption, 4

LIBERTY U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2009).

299 This presents at least a partial solution to the conflict that would inevitably
result from the adoption of a Kantian view. See Lebech, supra note 66, at 5.
300 See Bartholet, supra note 9, at 157-58 (describing the recent change in position
of the European Parliament and Romania in this respect).
301 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 13, at 320-22.
302

Id.

303 See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17 (attempting
to address and correct the mentality of cultural superiority).

HUMAN RIGHTS &INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

2014

581

recognize that intercountry and intercultural adoption can, in some
cases, take as much from a child as it gives, depending on how
adoptive families approach the problem of intercultural transfer.
On the other hand, as the Russian government's reaction to
isolated cases of harm befalling adoptive children shows, some of
the pushback from Second World and Third World governments
to adopting out their child citizens has not been focused on
protecting birth families or their children. Some countries have
slowed or ended intercountry adoption because they have felt it
was a black mark on the country's international image to admit
that they could not adequately care for orphaned or abandoned
children within their own nations.3" However, they have not
necessarily responded to what they consider to be a national shame
by increasing efforts to ensure adoption within their own
nations.30 In these cases, the "best interests" standard is critical in
pressuring countries to provide the social supports necessary for
birth parents to keep their children, find national adoptive families,
and help them make successful transitions or otherwise permit
children to be adopted by families worldwide who are able to care
for them properly.3 06 The Hague Convention recognizes that
"intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his
or her State of origin."3 07 It requires states to consider what they
might do to ensure both efforts to place the child within his state
of origin and to cooperate with intercountry agencies when they
cannot make an in-country placement.

304 See, e.g., Bartholet,supra note 15, at 358 ("National pride appears to be a major
reason sending countries often refuse to allow their children to be adopted
internationally, with countries embarrassed to be shown up as unable to care for 'their
own,' and willing to claim ownership rights even if in fact they are unable to provide
such care.").
305 See Nick Paton Walsh, Russia Dumps Its Children on the Streets, THE
OBSERVER
(Apr.
17,
2004),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/18/
russia.nickpatonwalsh; see also Allen, supra note 15, at 1701 (describing the failure of
the Soviet state to care adequately for the children in its charge); see also Bartholet,
supra note 8, at 191 (noting critics' complaint that there is "something shameful about
sending homeless children abroad.").
306 See Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl.
307

Id.
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IV. Children's Right to Grow and to be Loved
The CRC, CPPR, and other international instruments
recognize that a necessary, if not sufficient, right to preserving
human dignity is what might be termed the right to sustenance-to
those material needs that make life itself possible without extreme
pain or want: food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. In some
cultures, including the United States, not even these rights are
guaranteed, at least not at the level of constitutional or basic
law.30 s In the American conception, virtually all basic rights are
negative rights or opportunity rights-the government may not
interfere with a person's pursuit of sustenance except to the extent
that a person violates the rights of others, but the government also
has no obligation to provide sustenance to those who are presumed
to have the capacity and liberty to seek sustenance for
themselves.30 9 However, in the case of children, respect for human
dignity must necessarily carry much heavier positive duties even
in "negative rights" constitutions, like that of the United States.
Children cannot meet their own basic survival needs for food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care alone because modem
economies preclude them from utilizing others' property or

working to meet their needs.
However, the conventions also recognize rights beyond those
basic physical needs. The preamble to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child recognizes a moral right of children to grow up
"in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and
understanding" and to be "fully prepared to live an individual life
in society, and brought up in ... the spirit of peace, dignity,
tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity."3 10 These moral rights
are instantiated in the state parties' promises to preserve a child's
identity, family when possible, civil and political rights, rights
against abuse or exploitation, and what the convention terms "the
right of the child to education.""'

308 See Dillon, supra note 32, at 182-85.
309 See, e.g., Ann 1. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using
InternationalHuman Rights Norms to Inform ConstitutionalInterpretation, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1195, 1198 (1987) (comparing failure of U.S. constitution to protect these basic
needs with international human rights norms).
310 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, pmbl.
311 See, e.g. id., arts. 8 (protection of identity), 9 (protection against separation from
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The right to grow or develop is practically instantiated by
experience and by interaction with others. While the right to
education enshrined in the CRC is a way of talking about
institutionalizing this right, at a basic level, human beings develop
as they interact with others who are different from themselves and
with the physical world around them.3 12 The experience of
encounters that nurture growth is paradoxical. On one hand, the
child will encounter others who will provide him with support and
resources-love, food, physical affection, a psychological and
spiritual sense of security and harmony, and knowledge, among
others.3 13 On the other hand, even the most loving individuals and
the safest physical environment will present every child with
challenges: whether he is figuring out how to crawl across the
floor or get food into his mouth, how to manipulate a parent into
providing a desired item, or how to discern what will make him
angry and what will make him pleased.3 14 Challenge is as much a
necessity in a child's growth and development as is a supportive
adult."' Formal education, as we understand the term, is an
institutional embodiment of this interplay of the child with his
world, but it is only a part, in some regions of the world a small
part, of what allows a person to develop.
The right to love and to be loved also has this dual aspect of
support and challenge that is critical to the development of the
human personality and, therefore, to human dignity. In arguing
for the right of parentless children to be adopted, Paolo Barrozo
has explained, in part, why these are necessary aspects of human

family), 12 and 13 (right to expression of views), 14 (right to freedom of thought,
religion, and conscience), 15 (right of association and assembly), and 28 (right to
education).
312 Deborah L. Vandell, Lana Nenide & Sara J. Van Winkle, PeerRelationships in
Early Childhood, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 45566 (Kathleen McCartney & Deborah Phillips eds., 2006) (explaining the importance of
human development through interactions outside one's family and immediate
community).
313 See infra notes 314-316, and accompanying text.
314 See generally Masten, supra note 226, at 228-29 (discussing the resilience of
children in various environments).
315 See Tony Newman, WHAT WORKS INBUILDING RESILIENCE? 17 (2004) ("The
ability of children to meet and overcome challenges is necessary for healthy
adaptation.").
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dignity.3 16 One reason, he argues, is practical: children are
relatively vulnerable to their parents' and family's "structures of
power ... that routinely allocate resources the young need to
survive and develop."3 17 Following Robert Goodin, he notes that
love transforms childhood vulnerability from an experience of
want, of being helpless against the discretionary power that
literally holds the child's life in his hands, to an experience of
"care, protection, trust and affection."'
Barrozo further argues
for a developmental aspect to love, stating that it "creates the kind
of conservatory where the share of human capabilities each person
is endowed with can have a fair chance of flourishing."3 1 9 In terms
of the interplay of support and challenge, parents and others who
love a child instinctively strive for that balance between support
and challenge-parents provide both emotional and physical
security for the child while pushing him or her to discover and
hone his or her abilities in response to challenges of the human
and material world.
Human dignity requires that human beings be provided an
environment that allows them to develop through this dual
experience of support and challenge, even beyond childhood.
That this is true can only be demonstrated by imagining its
opposite: consider what happens even to an adult in solitary
confinement for a limited period of time.320 Dr. Grassian notes
that most adults in solitary confinement suffer from "florid
delirium, characterized by severe confusional, paranoid, and
hallucinatory features, and also by intense agitation and random,
impulsive, often self-directed violence.. .. [I]individuals will
soon become incapable of maintaining an adequate state of
alertness and attention to the environment."3 21 Even if they are not
in solitary confinement, psychologists have documented similar
effects in orphanages, some of which have as high as thirty to

316 Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in the World: A Deontological Theory of the
Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 701 (2010-11).
317 Id. at 702.
318 Id. at 702-03.
319 Id. at 703.
320 Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 325, 330-31 (2006).
321 Id. at 328, 330.
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forty percent mortality rates.3 22 "[B]abies who are not held and
nuzzled and hugged enough will literally stop growing and-if the
situation lasts long enough, even if they are receiving proper
nutrition-die."32 3
In less dire circumstances, as Barrozo points out, love is
necessary to permit the child to develop because it is "in
unconditional love that the young ordinarily find the terra firma
that assures them of their place in the world, and where their own
sense of limitation and vulnerability is transmuted into selfconfidence and an appetite for the future as an inviting frontier of
open possibilities."3 24 Providing love thereby ensures that adopted
children can grow up to be self-reliant, capable individuals who
are intellectually and emotionally able to function in market and
similar economies, and to contribute socially and economically to
the care of the wider society.325 Similarly, nations have an interest
in making sure that the other developmental supports children
receive, including formal education, prepare them for economic,
social, and political citizenship.
However, there is an additional moral, dignitary reason why
the opportunity to love and be loved is one that every nation state
owes its young people. Except for the experience of divine love,
being beloved by others is the closest we get in this life to
experiencing being seen for whom we really are and to being
valued as ends and not means.326 In the experience of being loved,
we are valued for the complex of thought, emotion, experience,
and human response, often described as identity or personality that
is contained within and emanates from our bounded physical
self.3 27 Of course, it is a serious exaggeration to suggest that any
child in the world is loved unconditionally by anyone, since all
human beings have limits or conditions beyond which they cannot

322 Maia Szalavitz and Bruce D. Perry, Born for Love: Empathy, the Brain, and
Human
Connections,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
(Mar.
1,
2010)
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/bom-love/201003/touching-empathy (last visited
Oct. 27, 2013)
323 Id
324 Barrozo, supra note 316, at 703.
325

See id.

326 See Largen, supra note 262, at 287.
327 See Szalavitz & Perry, supra note 322.
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or will not sacrifice themselves for others.328 However, as
observed through human experience, the parent-child bond, and
particularly the birth mother-child bond, is most consistent in
creating the reality of a love that cherishes a child for who she
really is and that offers to sacrifice to ensure that such a child can
experience the love and growth that makes for a whole person.329
At the same time, we know from human experience both that
maternal-child love does not necessarily develop and that
maternal-child love, or parental-child love, does not necessarily
depend on a biological connection: some birth mothers and even
more birth fathers do not love their children, and some mothers
and fathers who do not give birth to their children love them
beyond measure.330 And, we know that the ability to love is not
restricted to parents-spouses, lovers, distant relatives, co-workers,
friends, and even small collectives can provide the love and
dignitary respect due a human being in the right circumstances
with the right individuals.
However, it is from this central human experience of motherchild love that the debates about whether Third World children are
better off being adopted by first world parents or staying in their
own cultures often develop. On one hand, First World adopters
argue that they have the time, resources, and love to provide
children with the security they need to develop as full persons.33 1
Moreover, they have the wherewithal to provide the child with
more encounters with the outside world through education, social
activities, travel, and the like.332 On the other hand, Third World
advocates legitimately argue that even a child's very small

328 See generally Adamic & Pierce, supra note 287, at 62-64 (describing the
bonding and attachment process that generally develops primarily with parents and
begins with the mother at birth).
329 See id.

330 A lack of loving connection between a parent and child is difficult, if not
impossible, to measure but, as a reference, the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse
and Neglect reported more than three million children as victims of abuse and neglect
from their parents in 1996, 16% of such cases reflect parental abandonment. Id. at 2-3.
Abuse is identified considerably less in adoptive families where only an estimated one
percent of homes have been recognized as abusive. Id.
331 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17 (attempting to address
and correct the mentality of cultural superiority).
332 See id.
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village-where members of the community are interacting with
him all the time, where he grows up learning the rituals of his
culture (stories, song, religious rites, etc.), and where he is put to
the challenge of mastering the natural world based on his own
creativity-provides the child with equally valuable encounters.33 3
That may be true, even if he does not have advanced formal
schooling, as it will be an experience that is more consonant with
his identity than the strange world he will experience through
adoption.
This is a debate, fueled by the implicit mistake inherent in the
"best interests of the child" that cannot be resolved at the level of
national or international child welfare policy. As written, this
language in the international convention can easily be ignored by
states and their institutions as a set of pious and unrealistic
platitudes, and perhaps rightly so. 334 First, no nation, indeed no
individual, can guarantee the outcome that the instruments hold
forth that each child on earth will be brought up in "an atmosphere
of happiness, love and understanding." 335 Not only are these
unquantifiable states of experience, but even to the extent we can
recognize their presence in an intuitive sense, we know that they
are not consistently achievable.33 6 Even in the best families,
sometimes the atmosphere is not happy, loving, or
understanding. 337 Second, and here the principle of subsidiarity
becomes useful, the right to develop as a full person and,
particularly, the right to love and be loved, at its core and certainly
for very small children, can only be accomplished in small units
such as the family.
What nation-states and the institutions that serve them can do,
however, is prohibit those structures that care for children,
particularly very small children, from making it virtually
impossible to effectuate the right of children for the opportunity to

333 See Smolin, supra note 99, at 37-45.
334 See Lebech, supra note 66, at 5 (recognizing that conflicting agendas will often
make it difficult to please each party in an adoption triad).
335 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, pmbl.
336 See Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 2-3 (demonstrating that even in a
nation as affluent as the United States, abusive households are common).
337 Id. at 63 (describing the potential for situations in which adoptive parents,
despite having a desire to connect with their children, will struggle to form a bond).
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grow and to be loved. The chief reason orphanages have such
poor results with children is that it is not possible, given human
limitations, for any large collective or organization to "love," to
create the intense, consistent, and self-sacrificing relationship with
another that typifies the parent-child bond.338 Thus, institutions
and organizations cannot be effective at creating the necessary
conditions for a child to experience being beloved, nor can they
respond in love to others.3 39 Using them to raise children,
particularly very small children, should, therefore, be a violation
of human rights whenever any other option that would ensure a
child's right to be loved and to develop is available to a nation.
Such an acknowledgement does not resolve the debate
between those who believe children without committed birth
parents should be adopted into First World nuclear families if at
all possible and those who believe that children should be cared
for in their own cultures to achieve full personhood in the
environment envisioned by the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. However, it does do two things: first, it insists that such
decisions cannot be made at an abstract level with per se rules that
either favor or exclude certain types of parents, families, or
family-like communities, or that may even exclude certain
children by making them invisible as rights-holders because of
who they are or where they live.340 Second, it places emphasis on
the two priority questions that a nation must ask itself about its
vulnerable children: Who will ensure that this child can survive,
and who will love him? Answering these questions by looking
intensively at birth parents, adoptive parents, and small
communities of care givers around the child through the lenses of

338 Romanian orphanages serve as a prime example of the shortcomings of
orphanages in raising physically and mentally healthy individuals. See Bartholet, supra
note 9, at 157-58.
339 Institutions are unlikely to have the capability to provide the personal
connection described by Maia Szalavitz as an important part of healthy development that
is generally formed with parents through a series of responses. Szalavitz & Perry, supra
note 322. If for no other reason, this may be the case due to inadeqaute resources to
provide the amount of physical contact with an adult that an infant needs for healthy
development. Id.
340 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, art. 2(1) (attempting
to prohibit any discrimination against children, but failing to adequately prevent
discrimination in the intercountry adoption system).
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realism, global interdependence, family diversity, and human
vulnerability will ensure that society's goals for the child are
achieved.34 1 It is the only way to ensure that the child and those
around him will be treated with recognition and respect for their
equal worth, afforded the protection of autonomy, and provided
support for their right to flourish as required by the concept of
human dignity.
The requirement that nation states recognize and respect each
child as of equal worth is particularly critical for the adoption
stream of "waiting children," who may be older or suffer from a
physical or mental disability. The "sorting" schemes of historical
adoption systems in the United States, which triaged children to
determine which would be considered worthy of adoption,3 42 have
no place in our contemporary paradigm for intercountry
Similarly, the emphasis of intermediaries in
adoption.3 43
intercountry adoptions on triaging children for earlier adoption
based on factors like disability, appearance including skin color, or
age needs to be denounced within the international adoption
community, and intermediaries whose placements evidence a
pattern of such sorting should lose their licenses or permissions to
facilitate adoptions.
V. Conclusion
The principle of human dignity thus implies both prohibitions
on, and positive responsibilities for, the state. The international
community has an affirmative obligation not to sit passively by
waiting for adoptive families, whether intracountry or
intercountry, to present themselves. Rather, the international
community should conduct aggressive outreach programming to
families in each nation, encouraging them to consider adoption
and making them aware of the range of children awaiting
adoption.344
This may require better efforts at subsidizing
See Bartholet,supra note 9, at 191 (entreating a focus on the "needs of children,
parents, and communities" in intercountry adoptions).
342 Ellen Herman, KINSHIP BY DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN
UNITED STATES 87 (2008).
343 Children with disabilities and medical conditions are now more likely to be
adopted as many adoptive parents find that they have the ability and resources to adopt
such a child. See Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 80-81.
344 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, arts. 20-21
341
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adoption than tax credits, which redound to the benefit of the
wealthiest families.34 5 Reflection on the actual experience of
families who have adopted demonstrates that adoptive families'
desires for building their families are as diverse as the children
who are available to them.346 Many families have both the
strength and the desire to parent children who do not fit the "ideal
child" paradigm. They may recognize that these children, who
might have been passed over for adoption in earlier periods, are
precisely the children whom they are psychologically or spiritually
called to love and parent.3 4 7 However, both financial barriers and
uncertainties or myths about the adoption process (or the sheer
bureaucracy of the process itself) may deter otherwise loving
families from initiating the process.3 48
National children's
agencies need to identify and eliminate these barriers, both
financial and procedural, as a matter of effectuating the rights
described in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
Hague Convention.3 49 Judges and lawyers who are involved in
creating and implementing adoption law should reinforce the
importance of recognizing the inherent dignity and worthiness of
children, emphasizing that each child brings different gifts as well
as different challenges to society.

(conferring rights on children to "special protection" on children deprived of their
"family environment" to which signatory nations have promised, and therefore have a
duty, to preserve).
345 See Hibben, supra note 298, at 136-37.
346 See Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 335. Also, cultural diversity in
modem adoption is evidenced by the 2001 Census, which indicates that over 15% of
adoptions were international and 17% of adopted children were a different race than their
parents. Katarina Wegar, Introduction, in ADOPTIVE FAMILIES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 1,

1-5 (Katarina Wegar ed., 2006).
347 See Adamec & Pierce, supra note 287, at 251 (describing findings that parents
who adopt special needs children often "place a greater emphasis on flexibility, patience
and motivation to adopt," and are "frequently older, more educated and married longer").
348 See, e.g., Hibben, supra note 298, at 157 (describing the intricacies of just the
tax implications of adoption).
349 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, arts. 20-21, and
Hague Convention, supra note 16, pmbl.

